diff --git a/wasi-runtime/runtime.js b/wasi-runtime/runtime.js
index 8f67141..fd8445c 100644
--- a/wasi-runtime/runtime.js
+++ b/wasi-runtime/runtime.js
@@ -210,8 +210,6 @@ class Wasi {
             // clock_res_get + clock_time_get touch this.instance.exports
             // .memory; the old stubs were no-ops and didn't need binding.
             "clock_res_get", "clock_time_get",
-            // random_get now writes into this.instance.exports.memory too.
-            "random_get",
         ];
         for (const name of m) this[name] = this[name].bind(this);
     }
@@ -758,25 +756,7 @@ class Wasi {
     path_filestat_set_times() { return 0; }
     poll_oneoff() { return 0; }
     sched_yield() { return 0; }
-    // WASI random_get(buf, buf_len): fill buf_len bytes at *buf with
-    // high-quality randomness. The old stub returned success without
-    // writing anything, so the destination kept its prior contents (zero
-    // in practice) — every std::random_device user got all-zero
-    // "randomness". That collided WebRTC peer ids across tabs in 3DForts
-    // (Catcrafts/3DForts#50). Back it with crypto.getRandomValues, which
-    // is a CSPRNG. crypto.getRandomValues rejects views longer than 65536
-    // bytes, so chunk for buffers above that bound.
-    random_get(ptr, len) {
-        const MAX = 65536; // QuotaExceededError above this per the WebCrypto spec
-        for (let off = 0; off < len; off += MAX) {
-            const chunk = Math.min(MAX, len - off);
-            // Re-view per chunk: the buffer can detach/grow between calls,
-            // and a fresh view also keeps each slice within the 65536 cap.
-            const view = new Uint8Array(this.instance.exports.memory.buffer, ptr + off, chunk);
-            crypto.getRandomValues(view);
-        }
-        return 0;
-    }
+    random_get() { return 0; }
     sock_accept() { return 0; }
     sock_recv() { return 0; }
     sock_send() { return 0; }