QUICServerCredentials{selfSigned} shelled out to the openssl CLI and kept
the pair in the fixed /tmp/crafter-network-quic-cert/, guarded by an
in-process mutex only. Three things went wrong with that:
- Processes started at once (crafter-build runs tests in parallel, and
inside the Flatpak they share one /tmp) each found no pair and each
ran `openssl req` over the same key.pem and cert.pem, which it writes
in place one after the other. A process could load one run's key with
another's certificate and fail in ConfigurationLoadCredential.
- /tmp is shared by every user of the machine: whoever made the
directory first could keep everyone else from writing there, or plant
a pair in it.
- Without the openssl CLI there was no certificate at all, and
ComputeCertificateHashSHA256 piped the file through it as well.
The pair now lives in $XDG_CACHE_HOME/crafter-network/quic-cert/ (else
~/.cache/..., else $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/...). Missing directories are made
0700, and the last is opened O_NOFOLLOW, refused unless the user owns
it, and made 0700 if it was not. A POSIX record lock on a file in it,
given up on after 10 s, covers both the check of the pair on disk and
its replacement, so one process makes the pair and the rest read it;
each file is written under a temporary name, fsynced and renamed into
place; and the listener hands msquic the pair from memory as PKCS#12
(QUIC_CREDENTIAL_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_PKCS12) instead of the two paths, so
a replacement cannot land between its reads of the key and the
certificate. A pair that does not parse, whose key does not match, or
that has less than a day left is replaced, which also repairs one a
crash tore between the two renames. A record lock rather than flock: an
flock is shared with a child forked while another thread holds it, and
the child holds it for its whole life. Threads of one process are kept
apart by the existing mutex, and the process keeps the pair it loaded,
so all its listeners serve one certificate until it nears its end.
The certificate is made in-process by :TLS in the shape the CLI
produced (ECDSA P-256, ecdsa-with-SHA256, 10 days, BasicConstraints
CA:FALSE, KeyUsage digitalSignature, EKU serverAuth, SANs localhost,
127.0.0.1 and ::1), with a random serial where the CLI also drew one;
ComputeCertificateHashSHA256 is X509_digest over the file's
certificate. The OpenSSL helpers are module-internal declarations in
:TLS, so libssl stays behind that one partition, and the TLS
partition's own development certificate is unchanged.
As before, the pair is reused across restarts while valid, so a
browser's pinned hash survives one; it is now replaced a day before it
expires rather than after, so a server is not started on a certificate
about to lapse. In the Flatpak, where /tmp went away with the last
instance, it now survives between runs too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
OpenSSL's socket BIO writes with write(2) rather than send(2), so unlike
PlainStream it cannot pass MSG_NOSIGNAL. Writing to a peer that is gone
therefore raised SIGPIPE, and with the default disposition that takes the
whole process down.
This is not an edge case. It fires on any teardown where the far side
closed first, because SSL_shutdown still tries to put a close_notify on
the wire — which is exactly what ShouldSendRecieveHTTPS1 does when it
drops a client whose certificate check failed. The test died on SIGPIPE
with every assertion passing.
Installing a process-wide SIG_IGN would fix it by changing how the
caller's own writes report failure, which a library has no business
doing. SIGPIPE from write(2) is delivered to the writing thread, so block
it for that thread across each OpenSSL call instead and drain any pending
instance before unblocking. A caller who already blocks SIGPIPE is left
untouched — a pending signal there may be theirs to consume.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
HTTP/1.1 was plaintext-only, which left `https://` to either an HTTP/3
listener or a terminating proxy in front. Neither helps the callers this
stack exists for — curl scripts, CI tooling, old proxies — so wrap the
transport in libssl instead.
Two new partitions:
:Stream a ByteStream with per-call deadlines on both directions, plus
the plaintext socket implementation. The HTTP/1.1 client and
listener now hold a ByteStream& and never learn which
transport they have, which is what lets one code path serve
both schemes.
:TLS TLSContext/TLSStream over OpenSSL 3, with credentials for both
roles: chain and hostname verification on by default, private
trust anchors, client certificates, mutual TLS, ALPN, and an
in-process self-signed certificate for development.
Both descriptors go non-blocking and every read and write is driven by
poll() against a deadline. That is required for TLS — a blocking
descriptor cannot express a handshake timeout — and it means a plaintext
write can now time out too, instead of parking forever against a peer
that stopped reading.
ClientHTTP1 and ListenerHTTP1 gain credential-taking constructors; the
existing ones still speak http://. The listener handshakes on the
connection's own thread, so a peer that stalls mid-handshake costs one
thread rather than the accept loop, and a failed handshake is counted
rather than logged — on a public port it is ordinary traffic.
MessageParser gains SetDefaultScheme so origin-form targets report the
scheme the transport actually used; handlers shared with ListenerHTTP now
see the same "https" they would over HTTP/3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
