crypto fix

.gitignore

@@ -26,3 +26,7 @@ orders.jsonl
 
 # Local Claude Code permissions — dev-machine tooling config, not project code.
 .claude/
+
+# generated EURC address pools: publishing one links every donation address
+# together on-chain — the privacy design forbids exactly that
+eurc-pool*.txt

server/implementations/Catcrafts.Server-Eurc.cpp

@@ -61,6 +61,14 @@ No permission is granted to copy, modify, distribute, or create derivative works
 // there is no cost to waiting when the destination is our own wallet.
 
 module;
+// The one place this codebase reaches past the standard library: durability.
+// std::ofstream::flush() reaches the kernel, not the disk, and there is no
+// portable "make this actually persistent" in C++ — so the cursor write below
+// needs fsync(2), and fsync needs a file descriptor. Included in the global
+// module fragment, which is what a module unit has instead of plain includes.
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 module Catcrafts.Server;
 
 import std;
@@ -71,6 +79,27 @@ using namespace Crafter;
 
 namespace Catcrafts::Server {
 
+namespace {
+
+// Flush one path all the way to the platter (or the drive's cache, which is as
+// far as fsync promises). Files and directories both, because a durable rename
+// needs the directory synced too, and only the directory case may be opened
+// read-only.
+bool FsyncPath(const std::filesystem::path& path, bool isDirectory) {
+    const int fd = ::open(path.c_str(), isDirectory ? (O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)
+                                                   : O_WRONLY);
+    if (fd < 0) return false;
+    const int rc = ::fsync(fd);
+    // Report the fsync's verdict, not the close's, but still close: leaking a
+    // descriptor per issued address would outlast any single order.
+    const bool ok = rc == 0;
+    ::close(fd);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+} // namespace
+
+
 namespace {
 
 // keccak256("balanceOf(address)")[0..4). A constant of the ERC-20 ABI, not a
@@ -169,12 +198,24 @@ std::optional<std::int64_t> Pow10(int n) {
 } // namespace
 
 // A 32-byte uint256 hex word, as eth_call returns it, reduced to an int64.
-// SATURATES rather than wraps: a balance larger than int64 can hold is still
-// unambiguously "covers any invoice this shop will ever issue", and saturating
-// there keeps every comparison downstream in ordinary signed arithmetic.
+// A value that does not fit is nullopt ("could not determine"), never a
+// saturated maximum: int64 base units is already far past EURC's whole supply,
+// so anything bigger is a broken or hostile node rather than a large balance,
+// and the one thing it must not do is satisfy the covering comparison.
 // Exported so the self-test can drive it with canned RPC bodies, the same way
 // ParseMolliePayment is driven — the HTTP around it is thin, the decoding is
 // where a mistake would cost money.
+// True when the reply carries exactly the numeric id we sent. Absent or
+// non-numeric is false: an answer that will not say which question it belongs
+// to is not evidence about a balance.
+bool JsonRpcIdIs(std::string_view json, std::int64_t want) {
+    auto doc = Json::Parse(json);
+    if (!doc || !doc->IsObject()) return false;
+    const Json::Value* id = doc->Find("id");
+    if (!id || id->type != Json::Type::Number) return false;
+    return static_cast<std::int64_t>(id->number) == want;
+}
+
 std::optional<std::int64_t> ParseEthCallUint(std::string_view json) {
     auto doc = Json::Parse(json);
     if (!doc || !doc->IsObject()) return std::nullopt;
@@ -200,9 +241,22 @@ std::optional<std::int64_t> ParseEthCallUint(std::string_view json) {
         if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') digit = c - '0';
         else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') digit = c - 'a' + 10;
         else digit = c - 'A' + 10;
-        // Saturate on overflow instead of wrapping.
+        // A value too large for int64 is not a rich buyer, it is a broken or
+        // lying node, and it must NOT read as "covers the invoice".
+        //
+        // int64 base units at six decimals is nine trillion EURC — orders of
+        // magnitude past the token's entire supply, so no honest balanceOf can
+        // reach here. This used to saturate to INT64_MAX, which then satisfied
+        // every >= comparison downstream: a node answering 0xffff…ff marked
+        // any order paid. nullopt is the honest answer ("could not determine,
+        // retry"), and it is the safe one — an unknown never settles an order
+        // and never lapses one.
         if (out > (std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::max() - digit) / 16) {
-            return std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::max();
+            std::println(std::cerr,
+                         "eurc: a node returned a balance too large to be real "
+                         "({} hex digits) — treating it as unknown, not as paid",
+                         hex.size());
+            return std::nullopt;
         }
         out = out * 16 + digit;
     }
@@ -238,8 +292,36 @@ std::optional<std::vector<EurcChain>> ParseEurcChains(std::string_view json) {
         if (!IsAddress(c.contract)) return std::nullopt;
         if (!ParseEndpoint(c.rpcUrl)) return std::nullopt;
         // 2 is the floor because amounts arrive as cents; anything below it
-        // cannot represent the invoice at all.
-        if (c.decimals < 2 || c.decimals > 18) return std::nullopt;
+        // cannot represent the invoice at all. The ceiling is NOT 18 (the ERC-20
+        // maximum) but what the arithmetic can actually carry: RequiredUnits
+        // multiplies cents by 10^(decimals-2), so at 18 decimals any invoice
+        // over €9.22 overflows int64 and returns nullopt — and nullopt means
+        // "unknown, retry", so the order would never settle AND never lapse,
+        // silently, forever. A limit the maths cannot honour is not a limit.
+        // 12 leaves room for every invoice this shop can issue (10^10 cents,
+        // a hundred million euro) against every real EURC deployment, which is
+        // 6 everywhere Circle has issued it.
+        if (c.decimals < 2 || c.decimals > 12) return std::nullopt;
+        // The block tag is interpolated into the eth_call params array, so it
+        // is the one field that must be an allowlist rather than a shape check.
+        // Left unvalidated it took anything: a typo silenced the chain
+        // permanently (an unknown tag makes every call fail, which is nullopt
+        // forever — the same never-settles-never-lapses trap as above), and a
+        // value containing a quote closed the JSON string and appended further
+        // params, reaching the state-override slot on nodes that implement it.
+        static constexpr std::string_view kTags[] = {
+            "finalized", "safe", "latest", "earliest", "pending"
+        };
+        const bool namedTag = std::ranges::find(kTags, c.blockTag) != std::end(kTags);
+        // A specific block number is legitimate and is hex-quantity shaped.
+        const bool hexTag = c.blockTag.size() > 2 && c.blockTag.size() <= 18
+                            && c.blockTag.starts_with("0x")
+                            && std::ranges::all_of(
+                                   std::string_view(c.blockTag).substr(2),
+                                   [](unsigned char ch) {
+                                       return std::isxdigit(ch) != 0;
+                                   });
+        if (!namedTag && !hexTag) return std::nullopt;
         // "latest" is accepted but is a foot-gun worth naming: it reports state
         // that a reorg can still take back.
         if (c.blockTag == "latest") {
@@ -247,6 +329,44 @@ std::optional<std::vector<EurcChain>> ParseEurcChains(std::string_view json) {
                          "eurc: chain '{}' watches block_tag=latest — a reorg can "
                          "un-pay a settled order; prefer 'finalized'", c.name);
         }
+        // Circle's own EURC deployments, compiled in. NOT a refusal: Circle can
+        // deploy to a new chain, and a shop that cannot be pointed at one until
+        // this file is edited is worse than one that warns. But a contract that
+        // merely LOOKS like an address is otherwise checked by nobody —
+        // IsAddress accepts any 40 hex digits, EIP-55 is deliberately not
+        // verified, and asking balanceOf of the wrong token means a dust
+        // balance of something else can cover an invoice. So when the chain is
+        // one we know, say so loudly.
+        struct KnownContract { std::string_view chain; std::string_view contract; };
+        static constexpr KnownContract kCircle[] = {
+            { "base",      "0x60a3e35cc302bfa44cb288bc5a4f316fdb1adb42" },
+            { "ethereum",  "0x1abaea1f7c830bd89acc67ec4af516284b1bc33c" },
+        };
+        for (const KnownContract& known : kCircle) {
+            if (known.chain == c.name && known.contract != c.contract) {
+                std::println(std::cerr,
+                             "eurc: WARNING: chain '{}' points at contract {} but "
+                             "Circle's EURC on that chain is {} — a wrong contract "
+                             "means watching the wrong token. Verify against "
+                             "developers.circle.com/stablecoins/eurc-contract-addresses",
+                             c.name, c.contract, known.contract);
+            }
+        }
+        // Two chains sharing a name is not a naming nit: the HTTP clients are
+        // held in a map keyed by name, so the second entry silently reuses the
+        // first one's connection and its requests go to the FIRST host. One
+        // chain then goes unwatched, and during a testnet rehearsal a testnet
+        // balance could settle a mainnet order. The pool loader already refuses
+        // duplicate addresses for the same class of reason.
+        for (const EurcChain& seen : out) {
+            if (seen.name == c.name) {
+                std::println(std::cerr,
+                             "eurc: two chains are both named '{}' — names key the "
+                             "connection map, so one of them would never be queried",
+                             c.name);
+                return std::nullopt;
+            }
+        }
         out.push_back(std::move(c));
     }
     if (out.empty()) return std::nullopt;
@@ -286,7 +406,36 @@ public:
     bool Load() {
         if (!LoadChains()) return false;
         if (!LoadPool()) return false;
+        // One lock and one (initially empty) connection slot per chain, both
+        // created here so neither map is ever structurally modified again.
+        // That is what makes it safe for two chains to be in Call at the same
+        // time under different locks: operator[] on a missing key would insert,
+        // and inserting into a shared map from two threads is a race the
+        // per-chain locks could not see.
+        for (const EurcChain& chain : chains_) {
+            connLocks_.emplace(chain.name, std::make_unique<std::mutex>());
+            clients_.emplace(chain.name, nullptr);
+        }
         cursor_ = ReadCursor();
+        // The cursor is an index into a SPECIFIC pool file, but nothing in it
+        // ever said which — so a cursor and a pool that do not belong together
+        // used to load silently. Two routine operator actions produce exactly
+        // that: restoring an older ledger backup (the closing advice in
+        // tools/enable-eurc.sh has the operator back the cursor up alongside
+        // orders.jsonl, and restoring rewinds it), and replacing the pool with
+        // one from a different seed (the stale cursor then skips the new
+        // pool's head while every old order's index resolves to a different
+        // address, so the reconciler watches the wrong place and those orders
+        // never settle).
+        //
+        // A stamp file next to the cursor closes both. It records how many
+        // lines the pool had and a digest of the addresses the cursor has
+        // ALREADY issued — the prefix that must never change, since those are
+        // published. A pool that still starts with the same issued prefix and
+        // has only grown is a legitimate append; anything else is a refusal
+        // with the reason spelled out, because guessing here reissues live
+        // addresses.
+        if (!CheckPoolStamp()) return false;
         if (cursor_ >= pool_.size()) {
             std::println(std::cerr,
                          "eurc: address pool is exhausted ({} of {} used) — top it "
@@ -356,8 +505,21 @@ public:
 
     std::optional<PaidStatus> CheckPaid(const std::string& payId,
                                         std::int64_t expectedMinor) override {
-        std::lock_guard lock(mutex_);
-
+        // NO rail mutex here, deliberately, and this is a fix rather than an
+        // omission. Everything this function reads — chains_, and the config —
+        // is immutable once Load has returned; the only shared mutable state it
+        // touches is each chain's HTTP connection, which Call now guards with
+        // that chain's own lock.
+        //
+        // Holding mutex_ across the calls below was a checkout outage waiting
+        // for a slow node. ClientHTTP1 defaults to a 30 s request and 15 s
+        // handshake timeout, so one hung endpoint held the rail for ~45 s per
+        // chain — and the reconciler walks EVERY awaiting order per sweep,
+        // each taking the same lock, while a real buyer's CreateLink (which
+        // needs the mutex only to hand out a pool address, no network at all)
+        // queued behind the whole procession. The Mollie side of this file's
+        // sibling had the identical incident; see the arrival-poll note in
+        // Catcrafts.Server-Http.cpp.
         const std::optional<PayIdParts> parts = SplitPayId(payId);
         if (!parts) return PaidStatus{ PayState::Dead, {} };
         const std::string& address = parts->address;
@@ -491,6 +653,17 @@ private:
 
         const std::optional<std::string> res = Call(chain, body);
         if (!res) return std::nullopt;
+        // The response's id must be the one we sent. On a fresh connection per
+        // call this is belt-and-braces, but the client keeps connections alive
+        // between polls, and a pipelined or mismatched reply read as this
+        // address's balance is the one decoding mistake that could settle the
+        // wrong order. Cheap to check, so check it.
+        if (!JsonRpcIdIs(*res, 1)) {
+            std::println(std::cerr,
+                         "eurc: chain '{}' answered with a different request id — "
+                         "discarding rather than reading it as this balance", chain.name);
+            return std::nullopt;
+        }
         const std::optional<std::int64_t> units = ParseEthCallUint(*res);
         if (!units) {
             std::println(std::cerr, "eurc: chain '{}' returned an undecodable balance: {}",
@@ -502,11 +675,19 @@ private:
 
     // One JSON-RPC POST; nullopt on transport failure or a non-2xx answer. The
     // reconciler treats nullopt as "unknown, retry" — never as unpaid or dead.
+    // Called WITHOUT the rail mutex held — see the note on CheckPaid. What it
+    // needs instead is exclusive use of this chain's connection, which is its
+    // own lock, per chain: two chains can be in flight at once, and neither
+    // blocks a buyer's checkout.
     std::optional<std::string> Call(const EurcChain& chain, const std::string& body) {
         const std::optional<Endpoint> ep = ParseEndpoint(chain.rpcUrl);
         if (!ep) return std::nullopt;
+        std::mutex& connLock = ConnLockFor(chain.name);
+        std::lock_guard conn(connLock);
         try {
-            std::unique_ptr<Crafter::ClientHTTP1>& client = clients_[chain.name];
+            const auto slot = clients_.find(chain.name);
+            if (slot == clients_.end()) return std::nullopt;   // not a loaded chain
+            std::unique_ptr<Crafter::ClientHTTP1>& client = slot->second;
             if (!client) {
                 client = ep->tls
                              ? std::make_unique<Crafter::ClientHTTP1>(
@@ -533,7 +714,9 @@ private:
             return res.body;
         } catch (const std::exception& e) {
             std::println(std::cerr, "eurc: chain '{}' call failed: {}", chain.name, e.what());
-            clients_[chain.name].reset();   // dial fresh next time
+            if (const auto slot = clients_.find(chain.name); slot != clients_.end()) {
+                slot->second.reset();   // dial fresh next time
+            }
             return std::nullopt;
         }
     }
@@ -615,14 +798,134 @@ private:
         return true;
     }
 
+    std::filesystem::path StampPath() const {
+        std::filesystem::path p = cfg_.eurcPoolPath;
+        p += ".issued";
+        return p;
+    }
+
+    // A cheap, dependency-free digest of the issued prefix. Not a security
+    // hash and not trying to be: the threat is an operator mistake — a
+    // restored backup, a swapped pool — not someone forging a stamp they
+    // already have write access to. FNV-1a over the issued addresses in order
+    // catches every reordering, substitution and truncation that matters.
+    std::string IssuedDigest(std::size_t upTo) const {
+        std::uint64_t h = 0xcbf29ce484222325ULL;
+        for (std::size_t i = 0; i < upTo && i < pool_.size(); ++i) {
+            for (const unsigned char c : pool_[i]) {
+                h = (h ^ c) * 0x100000001b3ULL;
+            }
+            h = (h ^ '\n') * 0x100000001b3ULL;
+        }
+        return std::format("{:016x}", h);
+    }
+
+    // Verify the cursor belongs to this pool, then record the new stamp.
+    // Missing stamp with a zero cursor is a fresh pool; missing stamp with a
+    // non-zero cursor is a pool from before stamping existed, which is
+    // accepted once (there is nothing to compare against) and stamped now.
+    bool CheckPoolStamp() {
+        if (cursor_ == std::numeric_limits<std::size_t>::max()) return true;  // already refusing
+
+        std::ifstream in(StampPath(), std::ios::binary);
+        if (in) {
+            std::size_t stampedCount = 0;
+            std::size_t stampedCursor = 0;
+            std::string stampedDigest;
+            if (!(in >> stampedCount >> stampedCursor >> stampedDigest)) {
+                std::println(std::cerr,
+                             "eurc: pool stamp '{}' is unreadable — refusing rather "
+                             "than risk reissuing a published address. Delete it only "
+                             "if you are certain the cursor matches the pool.",
+                             StampPath().string());
+                return false;
+            }
+            if (stampedCursor > cursor_) {
+                std::println(std::cerr,
+                             "eurc: the cursor went BACKWARDS ({} now, {} before) — "
+                             "a restored backup or a reverted write. Refusing: the "
+                             "addresses between the two are already published and "
+                             "reissuing one would settle two orders on one payment. "
+                             "To recover, set the cursor file to at least {} once you "
+                             "have confirmed against the order ledger which addresses "
+                             "really went out.",
+                             cursor_, stampedCursor, stampedCursor);
+                return false;
+            }
+            if (pool_.size() < stampedCount) {
+                std::println(std::cerr,
+                             "eurc: the pool SHRANK ({} lines now, {} before) — it is "
+                             "append-only. Refusing rather than reindexing addresses "
+                             "already bound to live orders.",
+                             pool_.size(), stampedCount);
+                return false;
+            }
+            if (stampedDigest != IssuedDigest(stampedCursor)) {
+                std::println(std::cerr,
+                             "eurc: the pool's first {} addresses — the ones already "
+                             "issued — are not the ones this cursor was written "
+                             "against. This is a different pool (a new seed?) with an "
+                             "old cursor. Refusing: every existing order's address "
+                             "would resolve somewhere else.",
+                             stampedCursor);
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+        // Record where we are now. A write failure is a warning, not a
+        // refusal: the check is a safety net over the cursor, and refusing to
+        // start over an un-writable net would be its own outage.
+        if (!WriteStamp(cursor_)) {
+            std::println(std::cerr, "eurc: WARNING: could not write the pool stamp '{}'",
+                         StampPath().string());
+        }
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // Written BEFORE the cursor it describes, deliberately. If the machine dies
+    // between the two, the stamp is ahead of the cursor and the next load sees
+    // "the cursor went backwards" and refuses — which is the outcome we want,
+    // because the address for that index is already out. The reverse order
+    // would leave the rewind invisible and hand the address out twice.
+    bool WriteStamp(std::size_t value) const {
+        std::filesystem::path tmp = StampPath();
+        tmp += ".tmp";
+        {
+            std::ofstream out(tmp, std::ios::binary | std::ios::trunc);
+            if (!out) return false;
+            out << pool_.size() << ' ' << value << ' ' << IssuedDigest(value) << '\n';
+            out.flush();
+            if (!out) return false;
+        }
+        if (!FsyncPath(tmp, /*isDirectory=*/false)) return false;
+        std::error_code ec;
+        std::filesystem::rename(tmp, StampPath(), ec);
+        return !ec;
+    }
+
     // The cursor is the high-water mark of addresses ever issued. Missing reads
     // as zero (a fresh pool); anything unparseable is fatal at load rather than
     // silently rewinding to the start of a pool whose head is already published.
     std::size_t ReadCursor() const {
         std::ifstream in(CursorPath(), std::ios::binary);
         if (!in) return 0;
+        // Read the WHOLE file and parse it strictly. `in >> value` stops at the
+        // first non-digit, so it accepted "5 GARBAGE" as 5, "3.9" as 3 and "+4"
+        // as 4 — a cursor file corrupted into any of those shapes would have
+        // been believed, and believing a too-small cursor reissues addresses
+        // that are already published against live orders.
+        std::string text{ std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(in),
+                          std::istreambuf_iterator<char>() };
+        std::string_view body = text;
+        while (!body.empty() && (body.back() == '\n' || body.back() == '\r'
+                                 || body.back() == ' ' || body.back() == '\t')) {
+            body.remove_suffix(1);
+        }
         std::size_t value = 0;
-        if (!(in >> value)) {
+        const auto [end, ec] =
+            std::from_chars(body.data(), body.data() + body.size(), value);
+        const bool clean = ec == std::errc{} && end == body.data() + body.size()
+                           && !body.empty();
+        if (!clean) {
             std::println(std::cerr, "eurc: cursor file '{}' is unreadable — treating "
                                     "the pool as exhausted rather than reissuing",
                          CursorPath().string());
@@ -632,8 +935,30 @@ private:
     }
 
     bool WriteCursor(std::size_t value) const {
-        // Write-then-rename so a crash mid-write cannot leave a truncated
-        // cursor that reads as a smaller number than the addresses already out.
+        // Write-then-rename AND fsync, in that order, because the two protect
+        // against different crashes and only one of them was here before.
+        //
+        // Rename alone survives a process crash: a reader sees either the old
+        // cursor or the new one, never a half-written one. It does NOT survive
+        // a machine crash — without fsync the bytes may still be in the page
+        // cache when the power goes, and the rename can be durable while the
+        // data it points at is not. Both post-crash outcomes are the money bug
+        // this file's header calls unrecoverable: a cursor that rewinds hands
+        // the next order an address already published against a live one (two
+        // buyers, one address, and CheckPaid compares the address's TOTAL
+        // balance, so one payment settles both), and a cursor that lands empty
+        // reads as unparseable and refuses the rail.
+        //
+        // So: fsync the temp file, rename, then fsync the DIRECTORY, which is
+        // what makes the rename itself durable. This costs one flush per
+        // issued address, on a path that issues at most one per checkout.
+        // Stamp first — see WriteStamp for why this order is the safe one.
+        if (!WriteStamp(value)) {
+            std::println(std::cerr,
+                         "eurc: WARNING: could not write the pool stamp '{}' — a power "
+                         "cut from here could rewind the cursor undetected",
+                         StampPath().string());
+        }
         std::filesystem::path tmp = CursorPath();
         tmp += ".tmp";
         {
@@ -643,9 +968,23 @@ private:
             out.flush();
             if (!out) return false;
         }
+        if (!FsyncPath(tmp, /*isDirectory=*/false)) return false;
         std::error_code ec;
         std::filesystem::rename(tmp, CursorPath(), ec);
-        return !ec;
+        if (ec) return false;
+        // A failure here means the rename may not survive a power cut. That is
+        // worth a warning, not a refusal: the address IS out either way, and
+        // returning false would fail a checkout whose address is already spent.
+        if (!FsyncPath(CursorPath().parent_path().empty()
+                           ? std::filesystem::path(".")
+                           : CursorPath().parent_path(),
+                       /*isDirectory=*/true)) {
+            std::println(std::cerr,
+                         "eurc: WARNING: could not fsync the directory holding '{}' — "
+                         "the cursor is written but a power cut could still rewind it",
+                         CursorPath().string());
+        }
+        return true;
     }
 
     std::filesystem::path CursorPath() const {
@@ -654,8 +993,19 @@ private:
         return p;
     }
 
+    // One connection lock per chain, created at load and never rehashed after,
+    // so ConnLockFor needs no lock of its own. Sized from chains_ in Load.
+    std::mutex& ConnLockFor(const std::string& name) {
+        auto it = connLocks_.find(name);
+        // Every chain gets an entry in Load; a name that is not there cannot
+        // reach here, but falling back to the rail mutex is safer than a
+        // dangling reference if that ever stops being true.
+        return it == connLocks_.end() ? mutex_ : *it->second;
+    }
+
     RailConfig cfg_;
     std::vector<EurcChain> chains_;
+    std::map<std::string, std::unique_ptr<std::mutex>> connLocks_;
     std::vector<std::string> pool_;
     std::size_t cursor_ = 0;
     std::mutex mutex_;

server/implementations/Catcrafts.Server-Http.cpp

@@ -483,6 +483,26 @@ constexpr std::size_t kMaxSubmissionsPerPeer = 6;
 constexpr std::size_t kMaxSubmissionsPerWindow = 240;
 constexpr auto kRateWindow = std::chrono::minutes(10);
 
+// A SECOND, tighter budget, for crypto submissions only.
+//
+// Choosing the crypto rail spends a receiving address out of a finite pool
+// that only an offline wallet ceremony can refill, and the address is spent
+// per SUBMISSION rather than per payment — an order nobody ever pays has
+// still consumed one. Under the general budget alone, a stranger needs no
+// account, no card and no money to walk the pool to zero (six per peer is
+// plenty when a default pool is a hundred addresses), and then no buyer can
+// choose crypto until the owner is at a desk with paper.
+//
+// So crypto gets its own smaller allowance on the same window and the same
+// peer key. A real buyer picks crypto once, maybe twice after a mistyped
+// field; nobody legitimately opens six crypto orders in ten minutes. The
+// global leg is the backstop against a spread-out flood, sized so a broad
+// attack costs many addresses rather than the whole pool.
+constexpr std::size_t kMaxCryptoPerPeer = 2;
+constexpr std::size_t kMaxCryptoPerWindow = 20;
+std::deque<RatePoint> gRecentCrypto;
+std::unordered_map<std::string, std::deque<RatePoint>> gRecentCryptoPerPeer;
+
 bool RateLimitAllows(std::string_view peer) {
     const auto now = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
     std::lock_guard lock(gRateMutex);
@@ -511,6 +531,71 @@ bool RateLimitAllows(std::string_view peer) {
     return true;
 }
 
+// The crypto leg of the same limiter, charged only when the buyer picked the
+// rail that spends an address. Deliberately a separate budget rather than a
+// smaller kMaxSubmissionsPerPeer: tightening the general limit would punish
+// the ordinary buyer who fixes a form error, and it is not form errors that
+// exhaust the pool.
+bool CryptoRateLimitAllows(std::string_view peer) {
+    const auto now = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
+    std::lock_guard lock(gRateMutex);
+
+    auto expire = [&](std::deque<RatePoint>& seen) {
+        while (!seen.empty() && now - seen.front() > kRateWindow) seen.pop_front();
+    };
+
+    expire(gRecentCrypto);
+    if (gRecentCrypto.size() >= kMaxCryptoPerWindow) return false;
+
+    if (!peer.empty()) {
+        // Same leak-avoidance as the general limiter: expire every peer and
+        // drop the emptied entries rather than keeping a row per address that
+        // ever submitted.
+        std::erase_if(gRecentCryptoPerPeer, [&](auto& entry) {
+            expire(entry.second);
+            return entry.second.empty();
+        });
+        std::deque<RatePoint>& seen = gRecentCryptoPerPeer[std::string(peer)];
+        if (seen.size() >= kMaxCryptoPerPeer) return false;
+        seen.push_back(now);
+    }
+
+    gRecentCrypto.push_back(now);
+    return true;
+}
+
+// The inverse of NowIso8601, for the one caller that needs an order's real age:
+// exactly "YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ", which is the only shape this codebase writes.
+// nullopt for anything else — a ledger line from another tool, or a truncated
+// write — so the caller can fall back rather than trust a half-parsed date.
+// (std::chrono::parse would be the obvious tool and is not in this libc++.)
+std::optional<std::chrono::sys_seconds> ParseIso8601Utc(std::string_view s) {
+    if (s.size() != 20 || s[4] != '-' || s[7] != '-' || s[10] != 'T'
+        || s[13] != ':' || s[16] != ':' || s[19] != 'Z') {
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+    auto num = [&](std::size_t at, std::size_t len) -> std::optional<int> {
+        int v = 0;
+        const auto [end, ec] =
+            std::from_chars(s.data() + at, s.data() + at + len, v);
+        if (ec != std::errc{} || end != s.data() + at + len) return std::nullopt;
+        return v;
+    };
+    const auto y = num(0, 4), mo = num(5, 2), d = num(8, 2);
+    const auto h = num(11, 2), mi = num(14, 2), sec = num(17, 2);
+    if (!y || !mo || !d || !h || !mi || !sec) return std::nullopt;
+    if (*mo < 1 || *mo > 12 || *d < 1 || *d > 31) return std::nullopt;
+    if (*h > 23 || *mi > 59 || *sec > 60) return std::nullopt;
+    const std::chrono::year_month_day ymd{ std::chrono::year{ *y },
+                                           std::chrono::month{
+                                               static_cast<unsigned>(*mo) },
+                                           std::chrono::day{
+                                               static_cast<unsigned>(*d) } };
+    if (!ymd.ok()) return std::nullopt;
+    return std::chrono::sys_days{ ymd } + std::chrono::hours{ *h }
+           + std::chrono::minutes{ *mi } + std::chrono::seconds{ *sec };
+}
+
 // RFC 3339 UTC. Recorded so the order log can be read chronologically
 // without depending on file order.
 std::string NowIso8601() {
@@ -646,6 +731,16 @@ HTTPResponse HandleCheckout(const HTTPRequest& req, const Route& route) {
         return reject({{ "", "Too many submissions just now — please try again shortly." }},
                       parsed.value, "429");
     }
+    // Crypto pays a second, tighter toll: this submission is about to spend a
+    // receiving address that only an offline wallet ceremony can replace. The
+    // charge happens here rather than at CreateLink so the general budget is
+    // already spent too — a peer probing the pool burns their ordinary
+    // checkout allowance at the same time.
+    if (wantsCrypto && !CryptoRateLimitAllows(peer)) {
+        return reject({{ "pay", "Too many crypto orders from here just now — please "
+                                "try again shortly, or pick bank or card." }},
+                      parsed.value, "429");
+    }
 
     std::int64_t unitMinor = 0;
     Money::Totals totals;
@@ -977,7 +1072,21 @@ void ReconcilerLoop(const std::stop_token& stop) {
             auto [it, inserted] = seen.try_emplace(order.token, Seen{ now, now });
             if (!inserted) {
                 using namespace std::chrono;
-                const auto age = now - it->second.first;
+                // Age from the ORDER, not from when this process first saw it.
+                // Steady-clock first-seen restarts the seven days on every
+                // deploy, so a year-old awaiting order gets polled for another
+                // week after each one — wasted calls against both providers,
+                // growing with every abandoned order the ledger has ever held.
+                // The record's timestamp is the real age; a timestamp that will
+                // not parse falls back to the old behaviour rather than
+                // dropping an order that might be live.
+                const std::optional<std::chrono::sys_seconds> placed =
+                    ParseIso8601Utc(order.createdAt);
+                const auto age =
+                    placed ? std::chrono::duration_cast<
+                                 std::chrono::steady_clock::duration>(
+                                 std::chrono::system_clock::now() - *placed)
+                           : now - it->second.first;
                 if (age > hours(24 * 7)) continue;
                 const auto due = age > hours(2)
                                      ? seconds(minutes(10))
@@ -1180,7 +1289,14 @@ int Serve(std::uint16_t port) {
     });
 
     ListenerHTTP1 listener(port, std::move(routes), std::move(fallback));
-    std::println("catcrafts-server: listening on 127.0.0.1:{} "
+    // std::cerr like every other diagnostic, and not for consistency alone:
+    // under journald stdout is a pipe, so it is FULLY buffered — this line
+    // once sat invisible for hours (or died unflushed with the process) while
+    // deploy tooling polled the journal for it as a liveness signal. stderr
+    // is unbuffered; the one line that announces what the server IS must not
+    // arrive after the fact.
+    std::println(std::cerr,
+                 "catcrafts-server: listening on 127.0.0.1:{} "
                  "({} projects, {} posts, payments: bank={} crypto={})",
                  port, gContent.projects.size(), gContent.posts.size(),
                  gRails.bank ? gRails.bank->Name() : "off",

server/implementations/main.cpp

@@ -327,22 +327,47 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) {
             out = Server::MakeRail(cfg);
             // "off" is a legitimate choice and yields no rail; a mode nobody
             // recognises silently would too, which is how a typo becomes a
-            // shop that quietly stops taking one kind of money.
+            // shop that quietly stops taking one kind of money. So an
+            // unrecognised mode is still a hard refusal — but a mode we DO
+            // recognise, failing on its runtime data, is not the same fault
+            // and must not be answered the same way (see below).
             if (!out && mode != "off") {
-                // "eurc" is the one mode that constructs to nullptr for a
-                // reason other than a typo — its chains file or address pool
-                // did not load, and MakeEurcRail has already said which and
-                // why. Repeating "unknown rail" over the top of that would
-                // send the operator looking for a spelling mistake.
-                if (mode == "eurc") {
-                    std::println(std::cerr,
-                                 "catcrafts-server: the eurc rail could not load its "
-                                 "chains file ({}) or address pool ({}) — see above",
-                                 eurcChainsPath.string(), eurcPoolPath.string());
-                } else {
+                static constexpr std::string_view kKnown[] = {
+                    "mollie", "eurc", "fake", "fake-crypto"
+                };
+                const bool known = std::ranges::find(kKnown, mode) != std::end(kKnown);
+                if (!known) {
                     std::println(std::cerr, "catcrafts-server: unknown rail '{}'", mode);
+                    return false;
                 }
-                return false;
+                // A KNOWN rail that could not load its data — for "eurc",
+                // its chains file or address pool. MakeEurcRail has already
+                // said which and why, so this only names the files.
+                //
+                // This is a WARNING and not a refusal, and the reason is the
+                // blast radius. An exhausted address pool is a state a
+                // stranger can drive the shop into (every crypto checkout
+                // spends an address), and answering it with "the process
+                // refuses to boot" turns a spent pool into the entire website
+                // down — every page, the bank rail included — held down by
+                // Restart=always until a human runs an offline wallet
+                // ceremony. That trade is never right: this box already
+                // "serves the whole site minus checkout" when no credentials
+                // exist at all (see the slot notes above), and one rail's
+                // data going bad is strictly less than that.
+                //
+                // Silent degradation is the other failure to avoid, so the
+                // warning is loud, the listening line below reports
+                // crypto=off, and tools/enable-eurc.sh refuses to call an
+                // enable successful without the rail's own load line.
+                std::println(std::cerr,
+                             "catcrafts-server: WARNING: the '{}' rail could not load "
+                             "its chains file ({}) or address pool ({}) — see above. "
+                             "CONTINUING WITHOUT IT: that payment choice is off and "
+                             "the rest of the site is unaffected.",
+                             mode, eurcChainsPath.string(), eurcPoolPath.string());
+                out.reset();
+                return true;
             }
             return true;
         };

shared/interfaces/Catcrafts.Shared-Views.cppm

@@ -747,15 +747,15 @@ SafeHtml RenderPayFieldset(const Form::Checkout& prev, SafeHtml payError) {
         R"(<legend>How you want to pay</legend>)"
         R"(<label class="pay-option">)"
         R"(<input type="radio" name="pay"{}{}>)"
-        R"(<span><strong>Bank or card</strong> iDEAL, card, or a plain )"
+        R"(<span><strong>Bank or card</strong><br>iDEAL, card, or a plain )"
         R"(bank transfer. Handled by Mollie.</span></label>)"
         R"(<label class="pay-option">)"
         R"(<input type="radio" name="pay"{}{}>)"
-        R"(<span><strong>Cryptocurrency</strong> EURC, a euro )"
-        R"(stablecoin, paid from your own wallet. The amount to send is the )"
-        R"(euro total exactly, no exchange rate; the receiving address and )"
-        R"(the networks it takes appear on the order page, and stay reserved )"
-        R"(for about a day.</span></label>)"
+        R"(<span><strong>Cryptocurrency</strong><br>EURC, a euro )"
+        R"(stablecoin. The amount to send is the )"
+        R"(euro total exactly, with no exchange rate; the receiving address )"
+        R"(and the networks it takes appear on the order page, and stay )"
+        R"(reserved for about a day.</span></label>)"
         R"({})"
         R"(</fieldset>)",
         Attr("value", std::string(Form::kPayBank)),
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ SafeHtml RenderCheckoutForm(const Product& product,
         // With the choice rendered below, the fieldset lists the methods and
         // the lede would only repeat half of them.
         offerCrypto ? SafeHtml{}
-                    : Raw(": iDEAL, card, or a plain bank transfer, handled by Mollie"),
+                    : Raw(": iDEAL, card, or a bank transfer, handled by Mollie"),
         Escape(Form::kShipsToMessage),
         Escape(Form::kSanctionsMessage),
         CustomsNote(),

tests/ShouldParseEurcChains/main.cpp

@@ -41,10 +41,18 @@ int main() {
           "eurc: €570.43 as 6-decimal base units, full 32-byte word");
     Check(ParseEthCallUint(R"({"result":"0xFF"})") == 255,
           "eurc: uppercase hex accepted");
-    // 2^63 does not fit; the decoder must saturate, never wrap to negative.
-    Check(ParseEthCallUint(R"({"result":"0x8000000000000000"})")
-              == std::numeric_limits<std::int64_t>::max(),
-          "eurc: overflow saturates");
+    // 2^63 does not fit. It must not wrap to negative, and it must not
+    // saturate to INT64_MAX either: a saturated maximum satisfies the covering
+    // comparison in CheckPaid, so a node answering 0xffff…ff would mark any
+    // order paid. int64 base units is already past EURC's entire supply, so an
+    // unrepresentable balance is a broken or lying node — "unknown", which
+    // neither settles nor lapses.
+    Check(!ParseEthCallUint(R"({"result":"0x8000000000000000"})").has_value(),
+          "eurc: an unrepresentable balance is unknown, not a covering maximum");
+    Check(!ParseEthCallUint(
+              R"({"result":"0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"})")
+               .has_value(),
+          "eurc: a lying node's 2^256-1 does not read as paid");
     Check(!ParseEthCallUint(
               R"({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"error":{"code":-32000,"message":"x"}})")
                .has_value(),
@@ -85,6 +93,47 @@ int main() {
     Check(!Server::ParseEurcChains("garbage").has_value(),
           "eurc: malformed chains file rejected");
 
+    // Two chains with one name would share a connection-map slot, so the
+    // second's requests would go to the first's host and one chain would never
+    // be watched at all.
+    Check(!Server::ParseEurcChains(R"({"chains":[
+        {"name":"base","rpc":"https://a.example",
+         "contract":"0x60a3E35Cc302bFA44Cb288Bc5a4F316Fdb1adb42"},
+        {"name":"base","rpc":"https://b.example",
+         "contract":"0x1aBaEA1f7C830bD89Acc67eC4af516284b1bC33c"}]})").has_value(),
+          "eurc: duplicate chain names reject the whole file");
+
+    // 18 decimals is legal ERC-20 but not representable here: cents × 10^16
+    // overflows int64 above €9.22, and the overflow answers "unknown", which
+    // neither settles nor lapses an order.
+    Check(!Server::ParseEurcChains(R"({"chains":[
+        {"name":"base","rpc":"https://a.example","decimals":18,
+         "contract":"0x60a3E35Cc302bFA44Cb288Bc5a4F316Fdb1adb42"}]})").has_value(),
+          "eurc: decimals beyond what the arithmetic carries is refused");
+
+    // block_tag reaches the eth_call params array. A quote in it closed the
+    // JSON string and appended another param; a typo silenced the chain.
+    Check(!Server::ParseEurcChains(R"({"chains":[
+        {"name":"base","rpc":"https://a.example","block_tag":"latest\",\"0xdead",
+         "contract":"0x60a3E35Cc302bFA44Cb288Bc5a4F316Fdb1adb42"}]})").has_value(),
+          "eurc: a block_tag that injects JSON is refused");
+    Check(!Server::ParseEurcChains(R"({"chains":[
+        {"name":"base","rpc":"https://a.example","block_tag":"finalised",
+         "contract":"0x60a3E35Cc302bFA44Cb288Bc5a4F316Fdb1adb42"}]})").has_value(),
+          "eurc: a misspelled block_tag is refused, not silently never-settling");
+    Check(!Server::ParseEurcChains(R"({"chains":[
+        {"name":"base","rpc":"https://a.example","block_tag":"",
+         "contract":"0x60a3E35Cc302bFA44Cb288Bc5a4F316Fdb1adb42"}]})").has_value(),
+          "eurc: an empty block_tag is refused");
+    {
+        // A specific block number stays legitimate.
+        const auto ok = Server::ParseEurcChains(R"({"chains":[
+            {"name":"base","rpc":"https://a.example","block_tag":"0x1b4",
+             "contract":"0x60a3E35Cc302bFA44Cb288Bc5a4F316Fdb1adb42"}]})");
+        Check(ok.has_value() && (*ok)[0].blockTag == "0x1b4",
+              "eurc: a hex block number is still accepted");
+    }
+
     if (failures != 0) {
         std::println(std::cerr, "{} check(s) failed", failures);
         return 1;

tools/enable-eurc.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Turn on the self-hosted EURC rail in production.
+#
+#   tools/enable-eurc.sh POOL_FILE              validate, install, restart, verify
+#   tools/enable-eurc.sh POOL_FILE --append     top up an existing pool (append-only)
+#   --host NAME    ssh destination (default: hetzner — root via ~/.ssh/config)
+#   --chains FILE  use this chains JSON instead of the built-in mainnet pair
+#                  (how you rehearse against Sepolia — see deploy/README.md)
+#   --yes          skip the contract confirmation prompt
+#
+# POOL_FILE is the list your wallet generated at home: one receiving address
+# per line, # comments allowed. COPY it from the wallet, never retype — the
+# server cannot verify EIP-55 checksums (and neither can this script: that
+# needs keccak-256, which nothing in a stock shell provides), so a mistyped
+# but well-formed address would be accepted and published to real buyers.
+#
+# What this automates is deploy/README.md "The EURC rail": install the chains
+# file and the address pool, add EURC_CHAINS= to payments.env (setting that
+# variable IS selecting the rail), restart, and prove the journal now says
+# crypto=eurc. If the restart refuses — the rail's loader treats a bad pool as
+# a startup refusal, not a degraded mode — the env line is rolled back and the
+# service restarted bank-only, so a botched enable never takes checkout down.
+#
+# The remote pool is APPEND-ONLY once live: <pool>.cursor is an index into it,
+# so rewriting or reordering re-issues addresses already bound to old orders.
+# That is why an existing pool is a refusal without --append, and why --append
+# adds only addresses the pool does not already hold.
+
+set -eu
+
+UNIT=catcrafts-server
+CIRCLE_URL="https://developers.circle.com/stablecoins/eurc-contract-addresses"
+
+POOL_SRC=""
+HOST=hetzner
+CHAINS_SRC=""
+APPEND=0
+ASSUME_YES=0
+
+while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+    case "$1" in
+        --host)   HOST="${2:?--host needs a value}"; shift 2 ;;
+        --chains) CHAINS_SRC="${2:?--chains needs a value}"; shift 2 ;;
+        --append) APPEND=1; shift ;;
+        --yes)    ASSUME_YES=1; shift ;;
+        -h|--help) sed -n '2,28p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'; exit 0 ;;
+        -*) echo "enable-eurc: unknown option $1 (try --help)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+        *)  [ -n "$POOL_SRC" ] && { echo "enable-eurc: one pool file only" >&2; exit 1; }
+            POOL_SRC="$1"; shift ;;
+    esac
+done
+
+[ -n "$POOL_SRC" ] || { echo "enable-eurc: usage: tools/enable-eurc.sh POOL_FILE [--host H] [--chains F] [--append] [--yes]" >&2; exit 1; }
+[ -r "$POOL_SRC" ] || { echo "enable-eurc: cannot read pool file '$POOL_SRC'" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT INT TERM
+
+# ── validate the pool locally, by the server's own rules ─────────────────
+#
+# Mirror of EurcRail::LoadPool: strip # comments and whitespace, lowercase,
+# require 0x + 40 hex, refuse duplicates (case-insensitively — the server
+# lowercases before comparing, so "0xAB.." and "0xab.." are the same reuse
+# bug). Refusing here means the service is never restarted into a refusal.
+awk '
+    { sub(/#.*/, ""); gsub(/^[ \t]+|[ \t\r]+$/, ""); if ($0 == "") next
+      addr = tolower($0)
+      if (addr !~ /^0x[0-9a-f]{40}$/) { printf "enable-eurc: pool line %d is not an address\n", NR > "/dev/stderr"; bad = 1; exit 1 }
+      if (addr in seen) { printf "enable-eurc: pool line %d duplicates an earlier address\n", NR > "/dev/stderr"; bad = 1; exit 1 }
+      seen[addr] = 1; print addr }
+    END { if (!bad && length(seen) == 0) { print "enable-eurc: pool file holds no addresses" > "/dev/stderr"; exit 1 } }
+' "$POOL_SRC" > "$WORK/pool.txt"
+
+COUNT=$(wc -l < "$WORK/pool.txt")
+# The rail warns at 25 addresses left; starting anywhere near that is starting
+# on the reserve tank.
+if [ "$COUNT" -lt 50 ] && [ "$APPEND" -eq 0 ]; then
+    echo "enable-eurc: WARNING: only $COUNT addresses — the low-water warning fires at 25 left. Consider generating more before going live." >&2
+fi
+
+# ── the chains file ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+#
+# Built-in default is mainnet Base + Ethereum, Base first because file order
+# is display order and its note is the fee nudge the buyer sees. Contracts
+# must match Circle's list and nowhere else — matching the CONTRACT, not the
+# ticker, is what makes a fake "EURC" worthless here — hence the prompt.
+if [ -n "$CHAINS_SRC" ]; then
+    [ -r "$CHAINS_SRC" ] || { echo "enable-eurc: cannot read chains file '$CHAINS_SRC'" >&2; exit 1; }
+    cp "$CHAINS_SRC" "$WORK/chains.json"
+else
+    cat > "$WORK/chains.json" <<'JSON'
+{"chains": [
+  {"name": "base", "rpc": "https://mainnet.base.org",
+   "contract": "0x60a3E35Cc302bFA44Cb288Bc5a4F316Fdb1adb42",
+   "chain_id": 8453, "note": "lowest network fees"},
+  {"name": "ethereum", "rpc": "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com",
+   "contract": "0x1aBaEA1f7C830bD89Acc67eC4af516284b1bC33c",
+   "chain_id": 1}
+]}
+JSON
+fi
+
+if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    jq -e '.chains | length > 0' "$WORK/chains.json" >/dev/null \
+        || { echo "enable-eurc: chains file is not valid chains JSON" >&2; exit 1; }
+fi
+
+if [ "$ASSUME_YES" -eq 0 ]; then
+    echo "About to install these chains ($COUNT addresses in the pool):"
+    sed 's/^/    /' "$WORK/chains.json"
+    echo "Verify every contract against Circle's list — the only source that counts:"
+    echo "    $CIRCLE_URL"
+    printf 'Contracts verified? Type yes to continue: '
+    read -r answer
+    [ "$answer" = "yes" ] || { echo "enable-eurc: aborted — nothing was touched." >&2; exit 1; }
+fi
+
+# ── the remote apply script ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+#
+# Everything travels in ONE ssh connection (a tar of chains.json, pool.txt and
+# this script, unpacked and run on the box) because the host firewalls ssh
+# with `ufw limit 22/tcp`: a chatty multi-connection script trips the limiter
+# and the failure looks like a network fault, not a firewall choice.
+cat > "$WORK/apply.sh" <<'REMOTE'
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+UNIT=catcrafts-server
+work="$(dirname "$0")"
+
+# Derive paths from the unit itself rather than hardcoding: the unit is the
+# authority on where the ledger and env file live.
+ORDERS=$(systemctl cat "$UNIT" | sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*--orders=\([^ \\]*\).*/\1/p' | head -1)
+[ -n "$ORDERS" ] || ORDERS=/var/lib/catcrafts/orders.jsonl
+ENVF=$(systemctl cat "$UNIT" | sed -n 's/^EnvironmentFile=-\{0,1\}\(.*\)/\1/p' | head -1)
+[ -n "$ENVF" ] || ENVF=/etc/catcrafts/payments.env
+[ -e "$ENVF" ] || { echo "apply: $ENVF does not exist — is the Mollie side even configured?" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# Respect an explicit EURC_POOL override if one is already configured;
+# otherwise the server's default: the pool hangs off the orders path.
+POOL=$(sed -n 's/^EURC_POOL=//p' "$ENVF" | head -1)
+[ -n "$POOL" ] || POOL="$ORDERS.eurc-addresses"
+CHAINS_DEST=/etc/catcrafts/eurc-chains.json
+
+SVC_USER=$(systemctl cat "$UNIT" | sed -n 's/^User=//p' | head -1)
+[ -n "$SVC_USER" ] || SVC_USER=catcrafts
+
+if [ -e "$POOL" ] && [ "${APPEND:-0}" != 1 ]; then
+    echo "apply: $POOL already exists. The pool is append-only (the cursor is an index into it) — rerun with --append to top it up. Refusing to overwrite." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ -e "$POOL" ]; then
+    # Append only genuinely new addresses: a duplicate in the pool is a
+    # startup refusal, so filtering here is what keeps --append rerunnable.
+    added=0
+    while IFS= read -r addr; do
+        if ! grep -qixF "$addr" "$POOL"; then
+            printf '%s\n' "$addr" >> "$POOL"
+            added=$((added + 1))
+        fi
+    done < "$work/pool.txt"
+    echo "apply: appended $added new address(es) to $POOL"
+else
+    install -o "$SVC_USER" -g "$SVC_USER" -m 0600 "$work/pool.txt" "$POOL"
+    echo "apply: installed $(wc -l < "$POOL") addresses at $POOL"
+fi
+
+# World-readable is fine — chain names and Circle's public contracts are not
+# secrets, and the service user must be able to read it.
+install -m 0644 "$work/chains.json" "$CHAINS_DEST"
+
+# Append the rail selection, newline-safely, and remember whether WE are the
+# ones who added it.
+#
+# Two bugs lived in the one-liner this replaces. First, payments.env is
+# hand-maintained, so its last line may have no trailing newline — and then a
+# bare >> concatenated onto it, turning MOLLIE_API_KEY=live_abc into
+# MOLLIE_API_KEY=live_abcEURC_CHAINS=/etc/... : both rails broken, and the
+# rollback below could not even see it because the line no longer started with
+# EURC_CHAINS. Second, the rollback deleted EVERY EURC_CHAINS= line, including
+# one the operator had set themselves pointing at a different chains file — so
+# a timeout during an --append top-up of an already-live rail switched crypto
+# off on a host where it had been working.
+ADDED_ENV_LINE=0
+if grep -q '^EURC_CHAINS=' "$ENVF"; then
+    echo "apply: EURC_CHAINS is already set in $ENVF — leaving it as it is"
+else
+    # A file that does not end in a newline gets one before the append.
+    if [ -s "$ENVF" ] && [ "$(tail -c1 "$ENVF" | od -An -c | tr -d ' \n')" != '\\n' ]; then
+        printf '\n' >> "$ENVF"
+    fi
+    printf 'EURC_CHAINS=%s\n' "$CHAINS_DEST" >> "$ENVF"
+    ADDED_ENV_LINE=1
+fi
+
+# Not a bare command: under `set -e` a non-zero restart would abort the script
+# here and the rollback below would never run, leaving EURC_CHAINS set and the
+# service down. Type=simple returns 0 even when the process dies immediately,
+# so today this is defensive — but the unit type is not this script's to
+# guarantee.
+systemctl restart "$UNIT" || echo "apply: systemctl restart reported failure" >&2
+
+# Success is evidence from THIS invocation, and never the stdout listening
+# line: under journald stdout is fully buffered, so that line arrives minutes
+# to hours late or dies unflushed with the process — polling for it rolled
+# back two perfectly healthy enables. What is prompt and truthful:
+#   - the rail loader's stderr line ("eurc: N chains, ...") — printed only
+#     when EURC_CHAINS selected the rail AND the pool + chains loaded, and
+#   - /api/healthz answering — the server is actually serving.
+# Newer binaries print the listening line to stderr too; accept it as a
+# third, sufficient signal when it shows up.
+INV=$(systemctl show -p InvocationID --value "$UNIT")
+PORT=$(systemctl cat "$UNIT" | sed -n 's/^ExecStart=.*--serve \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p' | head -1)
+[ -n "$PORT" ] || PORT=8081
+echo "apply: waiting for the rail to prove itself (up to 60s)..."
+eurc_line=""
+healthy=0
+tries=0
+while [ "$tries" -lt 60 ]; do
+    [ "$(systemctl is-active "$UNIT" || true)" = failed ] && break
+    inv_log=$(journalctl "_SYSTEMD_INVOCATION_ID=$INV" --no-pager 2>/dev/null || true)
+    if printf '%s' "$inv_log" | grep -q 'crypto=eurc'; then
+        eurc_line=$(printf '%s' "$inv_log" | grep 'crypto=eurc' | tail -1)
+        healthy=1
+        break
+    fi
+    eurc_line=$(printf '%s' "$inv_log" | grep -E 'eurc: [0-9]+ chains' | tail -1 || true)
+    if [ -n "$eurc_line" ] && curl -sf --max-time 2 "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/api/healthz" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        healthy=1
+        break
+    fi
+    sleep 1
+    tries=$((tries + 1))
+done
+if systemctl is-active --quiet "$UNIT" && [ "$healthy" -eq 1 ]; then
+    printf '%s\n' "$eurc_line"
+    echo "apply: healthz answers on :$PORT"
+    echo "apply: EURC rail is LIVE"
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+# The enable failed — put the shop back the way it was before saying so. The
+# pool and chains files stay (harmless without the env line); only the rail
+# selection is rolled back, so bank checkout is never collateral damage.
+echo "apply: service did not come up with crypto=eurc — rolling back" >&2
+if [ "$ADDED_ENV_LINE" = 1 ]; then
+    # Only the exact line this run appended, and only if we appended it.
+    sed -i "\\|^EURC_CHAINS=$CHAINS_DEST\$|d" "$ENVF"
+else
+    echo "apply: EURC_CHAINS was already configured before this run — leaving it" >&2
+    echo "apply: alone. Crypto stays as the operator had it; only the pool and" >&2
+    echo "apply: chains files this run installed remain." >&2
+fi
+systemctl restart "$UNIT" || true
+echo "apply: rolled back. The refusal:" >&2
+journalctl -u "$UNIT" --since "-60 seconds" --no-pager | tail -15 >&2
+exit 1
+REMOTE
+
+tar -cf "$WORK/payload.tar" -C "$WORK" chains.json pool.txt apply.sh
+
+echo "enable-eurc: applying on $HOST (one ssh connection)..."
+if ! ssh "$HOST" "work=\$(mktemp -d) && trap 'rm -rf \"\$work\"' EXIT && tar xf - -C \"\$work\" && APPEND=$APPEND sh \"\$work/apply.sh\"" < "$WORK/payload.tar"; then
+    # apply.sh narrates its own rollback when the restart refused; a failure
+    # before that (ssh, tar, an apply refusal) means nothing was ever touched.
+    # Claiming either state from here would be a guess, so point at the output.
+    echo "enable-eurc: FAILED — see above for how far it got. apply.sh rolls back the rail selection itself if the restart refused." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Public proof, informative only: the donation form should now offer the
+# payment choice (it renders no radios when only one rail exists).
+if [ "$HOST" = hetzner ]; then
+    if curl -s --max-time 10 https://catcrafts.net/shop/donation | grep -q 'name="pay"'; then
+        echo "enable-eurc: catcrafts.net/shop/donation now offers the payment choice."
+    else
+        echo "enable-eurc: WARNING: the live donation page does not show the pay choice yet — check by hand." >&2
+    fi
+fi
+
+cat <<'DONE'
+enable-eurc: done. Next:
+  1. Smoke test with real money, smallest denomination: a 1 euro donation
+     paid in EURC on Base exercises the whole path for ~a cent of fees.
+  2. Add the pool (+.cursor) to whatever backs up orders.jsonl.
+  3. Decide the sweep cadence BEFORE the first real donation arrives —
+     the shop holds EURC until you sell it for euros at an exchange.
+DONE