fingerprintd/implementations/main.cpp

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Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (C) 2026 Catcrafts®
// lint-disable-file fixed-width-types
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
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// lint-disable-file no-char-pointer
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
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/*
fingerprintd the daemon shell.
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
Everything that touches hardware lives here; the decisions live in
fingerprintd-core, which is tested without a phone. Right now this reaches QTEE
and stops: root object, credentials, client env, the QSEECOM-compat loader.
Enough to prove the transport, not yet to drive the sensor.
Why the process must be long-lived, once it does more: a listener registration
is held for as long as the process lives and QTEE's listener table is global to
the boot, and one sensor reset buys exactly one trustlet init. So the process
that powers the sensor has to be the process that holds the session.
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
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*/
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
// libqcomtee is a C library and its headers carry no extern "C" guard -- it
// has only ever been consumed from C. Without one every symbol would be
// C++-mangled and none would link.
//
// The headers pull in <stdarg.h>, <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, and under
// libc++ those drag in C++ templates, which may not appear inside an
// extern "C" block. Including them first makes the nested includes no-ops.
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdatomic.h>
extern "C" {
#include <qcomtee_object.h>
#include <qcomtee_object_types.h>
#include <qcomtee_errno.h>
}
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
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import std;
import Fingerprintd;
namespace {
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
constexpr const char* Version = "0.0.2";
qcomtee_object* g_root = QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
// The ioctl trampoline libqcomtee calls. Cancellation is made asynchronous
// around it so the supplicant thread can be stopped while blocked in the
// kernel waiting for QTEE.
//
// tee_call_t's second parameter is `unsigned long` on glibc and `int` on musl
// (qcomtee_object.h keys it off __GLIBC__), so the signature has to match or
// the function pointer will not convert. The native build is glibc and the
// phone is musl, so both forms are compiled here.
#ifdef __GLIBC__
int TeeCall(int fd, unsigned long op, ...) {
#else
int TeeCall(int fd, int op, ...) {
#endif
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, op);
void* arg = va_arg(ap, void*);
va_end(ap);
pthread_setcanceltype(PTHREAD_CANCEL_ASYNCHRONOUS, nullptr);
int ret = ::ioctl(fd, static_cast<unsigned long>(op), arg);
pthread_setcanceltype(PTHREAD_CANCEL_DEFERRED, nullptr);
return ret;
}
// QTEE's callbacks are serviced here. Nothing QTEE asks of us happens without
// this running.
void* Supplicant(void*) {
for (;;) {
pthread_testcancel();
if (qcomtee_object_process_one(g_root))
break;
}
return nullptr;
}
std::uint64_t NowMs() {
timeval tv{};
::gettimeofday(&tv, nullptr);
return static_cast<std::uint64_t>(tv.tv_sec) * 1000
+ static_cast<std::uint64_t>(tv.tv_usec) / 1000;
}
// ---- The credentials object
//
// QTEE will not take the credentials blob directly on the Register path: it
// takes an object and calls back into it, twice, while our invoke is still in
// flight. Two ops, GET_LENGTH then READ_AT_OFFSET.
//
// libqcomtee ships one of these, but only by pulling in QCBOR to build the
// map. The map is thirteen bytes and lives in Fingerprintd:Tee under test, so
// this serves it and the library needs no dependency beyond libc.
struct CredentialsObject {
qcomtee_object object; // must be first: we cast between them
std::vector<std::byte> blob;
std::uint64_t lenStorage = 0; // op 0's answer, pointed at not copied
};
void CredentialsRelease(qcomtee_object* object) {
delete reinterpret_cast<CredentialsObject*>(object);
}
qcomtee_result_t CredentialsDispatch(qcomtee_object* object, qcomtee_op_t op,
qcomtee_param* params, int num) {
auto* self = reinterpret_cast<CredentialsObject*>(object);
// On the CALLBACK path a QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with
// addr = NULL and size = the capacity QTEE will accept: the dispatcher
// supplies the buffer, so the handler POINTS the param at storage of its
// own and lets the framework marshal it. Writing through the incoming addr
// is a null dereference, which is exactly how this crashed the first time
// it ran against real QTEE.
if (op == static_cast<qcomtee_op_t>(fingerprintd::tee::CredOp::GetLength)) {
if (num != 1 || params[0].attr != QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
if (params[0].ubuf.size < fingerprintd::tee::CredLengthReplySize)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
self->lenStorage = static_cast<std::uint64_t>(self->blob.size());
params[0].ubuf.addr = &self->lenStorage;
params[0].ubuf.size = sizeof(self->lenStorage);
return QCOMTEE_OK;
}
if (op == static_cast<qcomtee_op_t>(fingerprintd::tee::CredOp::ReadAtOffset)) {
if (num != 2 || params[0].attr != QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT
|| params[1].attr != QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
// An INPUT param does carry a real address; only outputs arrive NULL.
if (params[0].ubuf.size < sizeof(std::uint64_t) || !params[0].ubuf.addr)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
std::uint64_t offset = 0;
::memcpy(&offset, params[0].ubuf.addr, sizeof(offset));
auto plan = fingerprintd::tee::PlanRead(self->blob.size(), offset,
params[1].ubuf.size);
if (!plan.valid)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
// Same again: point at the blob, do not copy into QTEE's buffer. The
// storage has to outlive the dispatch, which the object owns.
params[1].ubuf.addr = self->blob.data() + plan.offset;
params[1].ubuf.size = plan.count;
return QCOMTEE_OK;
}
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
}
qcomtee_object_ops g_credOps = {
/* release */ CredentialsRelease,
/* dispatch */ CredentialsDispatch,
/* error */ nullptr,
/* supported */ nullptr,
};
qcomtee_object* MakeCredentials(std::uint32_t uid) {
auto* c = new CredentialsObject{};
c->blob = fingerprintd::tee::BuildCredentials(uid, NowMs());
if (qcomtee_object_cb_init(&c->object, &g_credOps, g_root)) {
delete c;
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
return &c->object;
}
// ROOT op 2: hand QTEE a live credentials object and get a client env back.
// QTEE calls into the object while this invoke is outstanding, which is why
// the supplicant has to be running first.
qcomtee_object* GetClientEnv(std::uint32_t uid) {
qcomtee_object* creds = MakeCredentials(uid);
if (creds == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL) {
std::println(std::cerr, "credentials object init failed");
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
qcomtee_param p[2] = {};
p[0].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_INPUT;
p[0].object = creds;
p[1].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_OUTPUT;
qcomtee_result_t result = 0;
if (qcomtee_object_invoke(g_root,
static_cast<qcomtee_op_t>(fingerprintd::tee::ClientEnvOp),
p, 2, &result) || result) {
std::println(std::cerr, "ROOT op {} failed, result={}",
static_cast<unsigned>(fingerprintd::tee::ClientEnvOp),
static_cast<int>(result));
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
return p[1].object;
}
// IClientEnv op 0: open a service by UID on the env.
qcomtee_object* OpenService(qcomtee_object* env, std::uint32_t uid) {
qcomtee_param p[2] = {};
p[0].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT;
p[0].ubuf.addr = &uid;
p[0].ubuf.size = sizeof(uid);
p[1].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_OUTPUT;
qcomtee_result_t result = 0;
if (qcomtee_object_invoke(env, 0, p, 2, &result) || result) {
std::println(std::cerr, "IClientEnv.open({}) failed, result={}", uid,
static_cast<int>(result));
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
return p[1].object;
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
}
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
int Probe() {
namespace tee = fingerprintd::tee;
std::string dev(tee::DevTee);
g_root = qcomtee_object_root_init(dev.c_str(), TeeCall, nullptr, nullptr);
if (g_root == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL) {
std::println(std::cerr, "root object on {}: {}", tee::DevTee,
::strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
std::println("root object on {}", tee::DevTee);
pthread_t th{};
if (pthread_create(&th, nullptr, Supplicant, nullptr) != 0) {
std::println(std::cerr, "supplicant thread failed to start");
return 1;
}
std::uint32_t uid = ::getuid();
qcomtee_object* env = GetClientEnv(uid);
if (env == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL)
return 1;
std::println("client env obtained (uid {}, {}-byte credentials)", uid,
tee::BuildCredentials(uid, 0).size());
qcomtee_object* loader = OpenService(env, tee::UidQseecomCompatAppLoader);
if (loader == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL)
return 1;
std::println("QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID {}) opened",
tee::UidQseecomCompatAppLoader);
std::println("\nreached QTEE. Not driving the sensor yet.");
pthread_cancel(th);
pthread_join(th, nullptr);
return 0;
}
} // namespace
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
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int main(int argc, char** argv) {
std::span<char*> args(argv, static_cast<std::size_t>(argc));
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
bool probe = false;
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
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for (std::string_view a : args.subspan(1)) {
if (a == "--version") {
std::println("fingerprintd {}", Version);
return 0;
}
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
if (a == "--probe-tee") probe = true;
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
}
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
if (probe)
return Probe();
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
std::println(std::cerr,
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
"fingerprintd {}: no runtime yet. --probe-tee reaches QTEE; "
"`crafter-build test` covers the core.", Version);
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
return 1;
}