README: it works end to end through fprintd's own clients

README.md

@@ -75,30 +75,46 @@ itself**, not only under emulation.
 
 ## Status
 
-**The core is complete; the daemon does not run yet.** Everything was ported
+**It works end to end through fprintd's own clients.** On the Fairphone 6, as a
-out of the research harness that first made the sensor work (`utilities/fpta.c`
+systemd unit owning `net.reactivated.Fprint`:
-in the fp6 repo), one module at a time, each landing with its tests before the
+
-next started.
+```
+fprintd-enroll -f right-index-finger user   ten stages, enroll-completed
+fprintd-list user                            - #0: right-index-finger
+fprintd-verify user   (wrong finger)         verify-no-match, on the first press
+fprintd-verify user   (enrolled finger)      verify-match,    on the first press
+```
+
+Nothing in fprintd was modified; the daemon speaks its interface.
 
 | module | what it holds |
 |---|---|
 | `:Sfs` | the gpfile frame — the read/write offset split, the `O_TRUNC` guard, root mapping, path-traversal rejection |
 | `:Rpmb` | request/reply framing, the bytes-transferred out-parameter, JEDEC result codes, chunking, the one-time-programmable key guard |
-| `:Ta` | command surface, the 740-byte event context, capture flags, SAVE_DATA masks, enrol/auth payloads, the error table, the verdict rule |
+| `:Ta` | command surface, the 740-byte event context, capture flags, save masks, enrol/auth payloads, the error table, the verdict rule |
-| `:Engine` | baseline calibration, touch edges, enrolment progress, and the accounting |
+| `:Engine` | baseline calibration, touch edges, enrolment progress, the accounting |
 | `:Store` | the finger name map |
+| `:Tee` | QTEE service/op numbers, the listener table, the 13-byte CBOR credentials blob |
+| `:Sensor` | the pins, the timings, and the XPU guard |
 
 Every constant that was recovered by reverse-engineering carries where it came
 from, and the tests are written to fail if it is undone rather than to restate
-it. Several replay real captures: two SFS containers off the phone, and three
+it. Several replay real captures off the phone.
-recorded authentication runs.
 
-Next is the I/O shell — the TEE session, the sensor rail, the RPMB device and
+Two policy decisions live in the daemon and both were forced by measurement.
-the bus — which is the first part that cannot be validated without hardware.
+Verification is judged **per press**: any matching frame wins, only rejections
+is no-match — both correct presses in the acceptance run had rejected frames
+before the one that matched, so a first-frame rule would have failed them. And
+the shipped config sets `max_authentication_rescan_times` to 0, because at the
+stock budget a wrong finger never yields a terminal frame and a PAM client
+waits forever for the `verify-no-match` it needs.
 
-The working reference enrols a finger, keeps it across a reboot, and matches it
+**Not done:** packaging (`provides="fprintd=…"` so this replaces the fprintd
-with zero false accepts; the port exists to turn that into a service rather
+daemon package while `fprintd-pam` stays), the shipped storage policy, polkit
-than to rediscover it.
+(a caller-uid rule stands in), trustlet-side template removal (deletes drop the
+name only), cleanup when a claiming client vanishes from the bus, and the
+kernel config change — `CONFIG_QCOMTEE`, which selects the SHM bridge — that
+gates any public image.
 
 ## Runtime dependencies, not carried here