Commit graph fingerprintd/implementations
Author SHA1 Message Date
6c4622afff Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement
The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start:

    client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain
    calibrating the idle floor (5 samples)
      idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133
      ...
    idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266

133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces
the reference measurement rather than merely producing one.

Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither.

The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of
payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named
in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The
instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding
0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of
mysterious.

And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves
unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0
returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached,
which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named
constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold
calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another.

The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on
purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the
flags anyway.

--verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from
guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
1fb57cd1be Own the sensor rail, and run the init chain against it
The daemon now powers the sensor and initialises the trustlet against it. On
the phone, every step of the chain returning rc=0:

    gpiochip 'f100000.pinctrl' is /dev/gpiochip5 (168 lines)
    sensor powered, reset released, irq=1
      CMD 0x1006 INIT_SPI          rc=0
      CMD 0x100a PROBE_DEVICE      rc=0
      CMD 0x100b INIT_DEVICE       rc=0
      CMD 0x1004 TA_INIT           rc=0
      CMD 0x1020 WORK_MODE         rc=0
      CMD 0x100e SYNC_STATISTICS   rc=0

GPIO v2 chardev ioctls directly rather than libgpiod, which is on neither the
phone nor the sysroot and would be a dependency for three lines.

The chip is found by label, and the label is not what the device tree calls it:
the node is pinctrl@f100000 so the chardev advertises "f100000.pinctrl", while
every DT reference says "tlmm". Matching on "tlmm" finds nothing, which is how
the first run failed. There is a second check on the line count, because this
SoC has another pinctrl with 23 lines and driving line 75 of the wrong
controller is not something you recover from over ssh.

The XPU guard is enforced where the line is actually opened, not only asserted
in the core. gpio8-11 are the fingerprint SPI pads and touching one is an
immediate SError with the phone rebooting where it stands, so a refusal has to
sit in front of the ioctl.

Owning the rail is what makes the session recoverable at all: one reset buys
exactly one trustlet init and a second answers -205, so a failed session needs
the rail cycled rather than the chain retried. The harness split these across
two processes and every run began by restarting the one holding the rail.

CAPTURE_IMAGE answers -201 here and that is correct, not a regression: it needs
a shared memory region whose address QTEE patches into the payload, and none is
supplied yet. That is the next piece.
2026-09-02 18:24:12 +02:00
2648e46d43 Load the trustlet and configure it
On the phone, end to end from the daemon:

    lookupTA('focal64') -> result=23 (nothing to unload)
    trustlet loaded from /lib/firmware/focal64.mbn, distName='fingerprint'
    config /lib/firmware/fingerprintd.json: 349 bytes
      CMD 0x100d -> result=0 rc=0 (Success)
      CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=0 (Success)

The config is the one fp6fpcfg.py --daemon generates, so the reduction of nine
hand-edited ffcfg files to one generator is confirmed against the trustlet
rather than only against the files it replaced.

A stale instance is unloaded before loading, which is what stops a crashed
experiment costing a reboot; result=23 is the clean-slate answer.

The request envelope moves into Fingerprintd:Ta with the rest of the layouts:
command id at +0, declared length at +4, payload at +0x10, and on the way back
the trustlet's own rc at +8 and the capture metric at +0x0c. Both are HEADER
fields ahead of the payload -- the metric has been miscalled "payload+12" in
this project's notes, and every recorded finger number depends on reading it
where it actually is.

ENUMERATE answering rc=0 is correct here and not a regression: no group is
active and no storage listeners are registered yet, so there are no templates
to count.
2026-09-02 18:19:26 +02:00
a91fb2ff58 Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR
fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone:

    root object on /dev/tee0
    client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials)
    QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened

The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only
to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so
packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops
credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then
has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is
pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's
two-op read protocol is served here.

Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle:

  * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been
    consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in
    <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may
    not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first.
  * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl.
    The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled.
  * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The
    dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own
    storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter
    is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is
    how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour
    already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it.
    That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
1d26852a6b Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers
fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session,
the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and
net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of
that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around
it.

Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries
47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root
mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The
daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be
tested on a dev box with no phone.

The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE
reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still
needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte
path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it.
Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the
container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is
unlinked as tampered on the next session.

So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real
containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets
conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text
rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because
the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits
exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the
identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be.

O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as
write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096
bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to
shorten rather than relying on the opener.

Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read
offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00