| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
Jorijn van der Graaf
823c710b15
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0.2.3's manifest pinned the sha256 of one Android build's focal64 (16.82.0, the build the dev phone runs). Fairphone re-signs the trustlet every release, so that pin matched exactly one of the six builds seen, and two of two field reports had no sensor: one user on 16.100.0 edited the manifest by hand, another ended up with a file QTEE refuses. The manifest now carries '-' instead of a hash and depends on fp6-vendor-blobs 1-r3, which tries the active slot first and verifies the image's structure; QTEE's signature check is the gate it always was (one flipped byte -> ERROR_ELF_SIGNATURE_ERROR, measured 2026-09-03 and again today). post-install reassembles the trustlet right away, so 'apk add' no longer needs a boot for it. post-upgrade re-derives it from the active slot, which replaces a hand-placed or wrongly pinned file, and then restarts the daemon -- a plain restart, so a daemon that exited on a refused trustlet comes back up on the re-derived one. loadFromBuffer failures name the loader's verdict. The field's first report was a bare result=12; it now reads ERROR_ELF_SIGNATURE_ERROR with what to do about it. Probed on the phone with this build: a one-byte tampered image and 100000 random bytes both print it, the pristine image loads, and the suites pass 8/8. |
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| agent.cpp | ||
| main.cpp | ||