fingerprintd/implementations/main.cpp

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Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (C) 2026 Catcrafts®
// lint-disable-file fixed-width-types
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
// lint-disable-file no-char-pointer
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
/*
fingerprintd the daemon shell.
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
Everything that touches hardware lives here; the decisions live in
fingerprintd-core, which is tested without a phone. Right now this reaches QTEE
and stops: root object, credentials, client env, the QSEECOM-compat loader.
Enough to prove the transport, not yet to drive the sensor.
Why the process must be long-lived, once it does more: a listener registration
is held for as long as the process lives and QTEE's listener table is global to
the boot, and one sensor reset buys exactly one trustlet init. So the process
that powers the sensor has to be the process that holds the session.
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
*/
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
// libqcomtee is a C library and its headers carry no extern "C" guard -- it
// has only ever been consumed from C. Without one every symbol would be
// C++-mangled and none would link.
//
// The headers pull in <stdarg.h>, <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, and under
// libc++ those drag in C++ templates, which may not appear inside an
// extern "C" block. Including them first makes the nested includes no-ops.
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdatomic.h>
extern "C" {
#include <qcomtee_object.h>
#include <qcomtee_object_types.h>
#include <qcomtee_errno.h>
}
Own the sensor rail, and run the init chain against it The daemon now powers the sensor and initialises the trustlet against it. On the phone, every step of the chain returning rc=0: gpiochip 'f100000.pinctrl' is /dev/gpiochip5 (168 lines) sensor powered, reset released, irq=1 CMD 0x1006 INIT_SPI rc=0 CMD 0x100a PROBE_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x100b INIT_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x1004 TA_INIT rc=0 CMD 0x1020 WORK_MODE rc=0 CMD 0x100e SYNC_STATISTICS rc=0 GPIO v2 chardev ioctls directly rather than libgpiod, which is on neither the phone nor the sysroot and would be a dependency for three lines. The chip is found by label, and the label is not what the device tree calls it: the node is pinctrl@f100000 so the chardev advertises "f100000.pinctrl", while every DT reference says "tlmm". Matching on "tlmm" finds nothing, which is how the first run failed. There is a second check on the line count, because this SoC has another pinctrl with 23 lines and driving line 75 of the wrong controller is not something you recover from over ssh. The XPU guard is enforced where the line is actually opened, not only asserted in the core. gpio8-11 are the fingerprint SPI pads and touching one is an immediate SError with the phone rebooting where it stands, so a refusal has to sit in front of the ioctl. Owning the rail is what makes the session recoverable at all: one reset buys exactly one trustlet init and a second answers -205, so a failed session needs the rail cycled rather than the chain retried. The harness split these across two processes and every run began by restarting the one holding the rail. CAPTURE_IMAGE answers -201 here and that is correct, not a regression: it needs a shared memory region whose address QTEE patches into the payload, and none is supplied yet. That is the next piece.
2026-09-02 18:24:12 +02:00
#include <linux/gpio.h>
Serve QTEE's storage: the enrolled template loads The whole storage path now works from the daemon. On the phone, against the real store: listener 0x7000 sb=516096 -> result=0 REGISTERED listener 0x2000 sb=25600 -> result=0 REGISTERED SET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid=60 path='/data/vendor_de/0/fpdata' gpfile READ .../1lPrxAL0vXRvWPeDkW2c off=4096 len=252114 ... CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=1 templates loaded: 1 QTEE read a 252114-byte enrolled template through our gpfile listener, verified it, and loaded it. Since QTEE unlinks any container whose keyed integrity tag fails, a load is proof the framing is right -- the read/write offset split, the container chunking, and the RPMB anti-rollback read that has to succeed before QTEE will trust any of it. RPMB is served too: SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN, retrying the unit attention the LUN raises once after a reset. Writes are refused unless asked for, because they advance a counter that cannot be moved back, and key programming is refused unconditionally. The store was served READ-ONLY throughout, which is the point. A listener that serves bytes at the wrong offset does not merely fail: QTEE deletes the container it cannot verify, and that is an enrolled fingerprint gone. Read-only makes a wrong build harmless, so it is the default and writing is opt-in. Two ordering facts, both of which produce -2 with no storage read at all -- indistinguishable from a broken listener: * a template reload needs the device init chain to have run FIRST, because that chain allocates the per-slot array the reload writes through; * SET_ACTIVE_GROUP's second field is a NAMESPACE path, not a filesystem one and not the gid again. The trustlet hashes it into the group's directory name, so it has to match what the store was written under. Also: a positive rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template count there, and running that through the error table printed "unknown" for a good answer.
2026-09-02 18:42:20 +02:00
#include <linux/bsg.h>
#include <scsi/sg.h>
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
#include <pthread.h>
Own the sensor rail, and run the init chain against it The daemon now powers the sensor and initialises the trustlet against it. On the phone, every step of the chain returning rc=0: gpiochip 'f100000.pinctrl' is /dev/gpiochip5 (168 lines) sensor powered, reset released, irq=1 CMD 0x1006 INIT_SPI rc=0 CMD 0x100a PROBE_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x100b INIT_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x1004 TA_INIT rc=0 CMD 0x1020 WORK_MODE rc=0 CMD 0x100e SYNC_STATISTICS rc=0 GPIO v2 chardev ioctls directly rather than libgpiod, which is on neither the phone nor the sysroot and would be a dependency for three lines. The chip is found by label, and the label is not what the device tree calls it: the node is pinctrl@f100000 so the chardev advertises "f100000.pinctrl", while every DT reference says "tlmm". Matching on "tlmm" finds nothing, which is how the first run failed. There is a second check on the line count, because this SoC has another pinctrl with 23 lines and driving line 75 of the wrong controller is not something you recover from over ssh. The XPU guard is enforced where the line is actually opened, not only asserted in the core. gpio8-11 are the fingerprint SPI pads and touching one is an immediate SError with the phone rebooting where it stands, so a refusal has to sit in front of the ioctl. Owning the rail is what makes the session recoverable at all: one reset buys exactly one trustlet init and a second answers -205, so a failed session needs the rail cycled rather than the chain retried. The harness split these across two processes and every run began by restarting the one holding the rail. CAPTURE_IMAGE answers -201 here and that is correct, not a regression: it needs a shared memory region whose address QTEE patches into the payload, and none is supplied yet. That is the next piece.
2026-09-02 18:24:12 +02:00
#include <fcntl.h>
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
import std;
import Fingerprintd;
namespace {
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
constexpr const char* Version = "0.0.3";
Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start: client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain calibrating the idle floor (5 samples) idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133 ... idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266 133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces the reference measurement rather than merely producing one. Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither. The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding 0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of mysterious. And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0 returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached, which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another. The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the flags anyway. --verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
bool g_verbose = false;
Serve QTEE's storage: the enrolled template loads The whole storage path now works from the daemon. On the phone, against the real store: listener 0x7000 sb=516096 -> result=0 REGISTERED listener 0x2000 sb=25600 -> result=0 REGISTERED SET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid=60 path='/data/vendor_de/0/fpdata' gpfile READ .../1lPrxAL0vXRvWPeDkW2c off=4096 len=252114 ... CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=1 templates loaded: 1 QTEE read a 252114-byte enrolled template through our gpfile listener, verified it, and loaded it. Since QTEE unlinks any container whose keyed integrity tag fails, a load is proof the framing is right -- the read/write offset split, the container chunking, and the RPMB anti-rollback read that has to succeed before QTEE will trust any of it. RPMB is served too: SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN, retrying the unit attention the LUN raises once after a reset. Writes are refused unless asked for, because they advance a counter that cannot be moved back, and key programming is refused unconditionally. The store was served READ-ONLY throughout, which is the point. A listener that serves bytes at the wrong offset does not merely fail: QTEE deletes the container it cannot verify, and that is an enrolled fingerprint gone. Read-only makes a wrong build harmless, so it is the default and writing is opt-in. Two ordering facts, both of which produce -2 with no storage read at all -- indistinguishable from a broken listener: * a template reload needs the device init chain to have run FIRST, because that chain allocates the per-slot array the reload writes through; * SET_ACTIVE_GROUP's second field is a NAMESPACE path, not a filesystem one and not the gid again. The trustlet hashes it into the group's directory name, so it has to match what the store was written under. Also: a positive rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template count there, and running that through the error table printed "unknown" for a good answer.
2026-09-02 18:42:20 +02:00
bool g_listeners = false;
bool g_auth = false;
int g_frames = 40;
int g_frameGapMs = 500;
Serve QTEE's storage: the enrolled template loads The whole storage path now works from the daemon. On the phone, against the real store: listener 0x7000 sb=516096 -> result=0 REGISTERED listener 0x2000 sb=25600 -> result=0 REGISTERED SET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid=60 path='/data/vendor_de/0/fpdata' gpfile READ .../1lPrxAL0vXRvWPeDkW2c off=4096 len=252114 ... CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=1 templates loaded: 1 QTEE read a 252114-byte enrolled template through our gpfile listener, verified it, and loaded it. Since QTEE unlinks any container whose keyed integrity tag fails, a load is proof the framing is right -- the read/write offset split, the container chunking, and the RPMB anti-rollback read that has to succeed before QTEE will trust any of it. RPMB is served too: SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN, retrying the unit attention the LUN raises once after a reset. Writes are refused unless asked for, because they advance a counter that cannot be moved back, and key programming is refused unconditionally. The store was served READ-ONLY throughout, which is the point. A listener that serves bytes at the wrong offset does not merely fail: QTEE deletes the container it cannot verify, and that is an enrolled fingerprint gone. Read-only makes a wrong build harmless, so it is the default and writing is opt-in. Two ordering facts, both of which produce -2 with no storage read at all -- indistinguishable from a broken listener: * a template reload needs the device init chain to have run FIRST, because that chain allocates the per-slot array the reload writes through; * SET_ACTIVE_GROUP's second field is a NAMESPACE path, not a filesystem one and not the gid again. The trustlet hashes it into the group's directory name, so it has to match what the store was written under. Also: a positive rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template count there, and running that through the error table printed "unknown" for a good answer.
2026-09-02 18:42:20 +02:00
std::uint32_t g_gid = 0;
std::string g_taPath = "/lib/firmware/focal64.mbn";
std::string g_cfgPath = "/lib/firmware/fingerprintd.json";
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
qcomtee_object* g_root = QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
// The ioctl trampoline libqcomtee calls. Cancellation is made asynchronous
// around it so the supplicant thread can be stopped while blocked in the
// kernel waiting for QTEE.
//
// tee_call_t's second parameter is `unsigned long` on glibc and `int` on musl
// (qcomtee_object.h keys it off __GLIBC__), so the signature has to match or
// the function pointer will not convert. The native build is glibc and the
// phone is musl, so both forms are compiled here.
#ifdef __GLIBC__
int TeeCall(int fd, unsigned long op, ...) {
#else
int TeeCall(int fd, int op, ...) {
#endif
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, op);
void* arg = va_arg(ap, void*);
va_end(ap);
pthread_setcanceltype(PTHREAD_CANCEL_ASYNCHRONOUS, nullptr);
int ret = ::ioctl(fd, static_cast<unsigned long>(op), arg);
pthread_setcanceltype(PTHREAD_CANCEL_DEFERRED, nullptr);
return ret;
}
// QTEE's callbacks are serviced here. Nothing QTEE asks of us happens without
// this running.
void* Supplicant(void*) {
for (;;) {
pthread_testcancel();
if (qcomtee_object_process_one(g_root))
break;
}
return nullptr;
}
std::uint64_t NowMs() {
timeval tv{};
::gettimeofday(&tv, nullptr);
return static_cast<std::uint64_t>(tv.tv_sec) * 1000
+ static_cast<std::uint64_t>(tv.tv_usec) / 1000;
}
// ---- The credentials object
//
// QTEE will not take the credentials blob directly on the Register path: it
// takes an object and calls back into it, twice, while our invoke is still in
// flight. Two ops, GET_LENGTH then READ_AT_OFFSET.
//
// libqcomtee ships one of these, but only by pulling in QCBOR to build the
// map. The map is thirteen bytes and lives in Fingerprintd:Tee under test, so
// this serves it and the library needs no dependency beyond libc.
struct CredentialsObject {
qcomtee_object object; // must be first: we cast between them
std::vector<std::byte> blob;
std::uint64_t lenStorage = 0; // op 0's answer, pointed at not copied
};
void CredentialsRelease(qcomtee_object* object) {
delete reinterpret_cast<CredentialsObject*>(object);
}
qcomtee_result_t CredentialsDispatch(qcomtee_object* object, qcomtee_op_t op,
qcomtee_param* params, int num) {
auto* self = reinterpret_cast<CredentialsObject*>(object);
// On the CALLBACK path a QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with
// addr = NULL and size = the capacity QTEE will accept: the dispatcher
// supplies the buffer, so the handler POINTS the param at storage of its
// own and lets the framework marshal it. Writing through the incoming addr
// is a null dereference, which is exactly how this crashed the first time
// it ran against real QTEE.
if (op == static_cast<qcomtee_op_t>(fingerprintd::tee::CredOp::GetLength)) {
if (num != 1 || params[0].attr != QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
if (params[0].ubuf.size < fingerprintd::tee::CredLengthReplySize)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
self->lenStorage = static_cast<std::uint64_t>(self->blob.size());
params[0].ubuf.addr = &self->lenStorage;
params[0].ubuf.size = sizeof(self->lenStorage);
return QCOMTEE_OK;
}
if (op == static_cast<qcomtee_op_t>(fingerprintd::tee::CredOp::ReadAtOffset)) {
if (num != 2 || params[0].attr != QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT
|| params[1].attr != QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
// An INPUT param does carry a real address; only outputs arrive NULL.
if (params[0].ubuf.size < sizeof(std::uint64_t) || !params[0].ubuf.addr)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
std::uint64_t offset = 0;
::memcpy(&offset, params[0].ubuf.addr, sizeof(offset));
auto plan = fingerprintd::tee::PlanRead(self->blob.size(), offset,
params[1].ubuf.size);
if (!plan.valid)
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
// Same again: point at the blob, do not copy into QTEE's buffer. The
// storage has to outlive the dispatch, which the object owns.
params[1].ubuf.addr = self->blob.data() + plan.offset;
params[1].ubuf.size = plan.count;
return QCOMTEE_OK;
}
return QCOMTEE_ERROR_INVALID;
}
qcomtee_object_ops g_credOps = {
/* release */ CredentialsRelease,
/* dispatch */ CredentialsDispatch,
/* error */ nullptr,
/* supported */ nullptr,
};
qcomtee_object* MakeCredentials(std::uint32_t uid) {
auto* c = new CredentialsObject{};
c->blob = fingerprintd::tee::BuildCredentials(uid, NowMs());
if (qcomtee_object_cb_init(&c->object, &g_credOps, g_root)) {
delete c;
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
return &c->object;
}
// ROOT op 2: hand QTEE a live credentials object and get a client env back.
// QTEE calls into the object while this invoke is outstanding, which is why
// the supplicant has to be running first.
qcomtee_object* GetClientEnv(std::uint32_t uid) {
qcomtee_object* creds = MakeCredentials(uid);
if (creds == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL) {
std::println(std::cerr, "credentials object init failed");
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
qcomtee_param p[2] = {};
p[0].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_INPUT;
p[0].object = creds;
p[1].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_OUTPUT;
qcomtee_result_t result = 0;
if (qcomtee_object_invoke(g_root,
static_cast<qcomtee_op_t>(fingerprintd::tee::ClientEnvOp),
p, 2, &result) || result) {
std::println(std::cerr, "ROOT op {} failed, result={}",
static_cast<unsigned>(fingerprintd::tee::ClientEnvOp),
static_cast<int>(result));
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
return p[1].object;
}
// IClientEnv op 0: open a service by UID on the env.
qcomtee_object* OpenService(qcomtee_object* env, std::uint32_t uid) {
qcomtee_param p[2] = {};
p[0].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT;
p[0].ubuf.addr = &uid;
p[0].ubuf.size = sizeof(uid);
p[1].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_OUTPUT;
qcomtee_result_t result = 0;
if (qcomtee_object_invoke(env, 0, p, 2, &result) || result) {
std::println(std::cerr, "IClientEnv.open({}) failed, result={}", uid,
static_cast<int>(result));
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
return p[1].object;
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
}
Serve QTEE's storage: the enrolled template loads The whole storage path now works from the daemon. On the phone, against the real store: listener 0x7000 sb=516096 -> result=0 REGISTERED listener 0x2000 sb=25600 -> result=0 REGISTERED SET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid=60 path='/data/vendor_de/0/fpdata' gpfile READ .../1lPrxAL0vXRvWPeDkW2c off=4096 len=252114 ... CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=1 templates loaded: 1 QTEE read a 252114-byte enrolled template through our gpfile listener, verified it, and loaded it. Since QTEE unlinks any container whose keyed integrity tag fails, a load is proof the framing is right -- the read/write offset split, the container chunking, and the RPMB anti-rollback read that has to succeed before QTEE will trust any of it. RPMB is served too: SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN, retrying the unit attention the LUN raises once after a reset. Writes are refused unless asked for, because they advance a counter that cannot be moved back, and key programming is refused unconditionally. The store was served READ-ONLY throughout, which is the point. A listener that serves bytes at the wrong offset does not merely fail: QTEE deletes the container it cannot verify, and that is an enrolled fingerprint gone. Read-only makes a wrong build harmless, so it is the default and writing is opt-in. Two ordering facts, both of which produce -2 with no storage read at all -- indistinguishable from a broken listener: * a template reload needs the device init chain to have run FIRST, because that chain allocates the per-slot array the reload writes through; * SET_ACTIVE_GROUP's second field is a NAMESPACE path, not a filesystem one and not the gid again. The trustlet hashes it into the group's directory name, so it has to match what the store was written under. Also: a positive rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template count there, and running that through the error table printed "unknown" for a good answer.
2026-09-02 18:42:20 +02:00
// ---- The storage listeners
//
// QTEE cannot reach a filesystem, so it calls back into the normal world for
// every template read and write. This serves those callbacks. The framing is
// Fingerprintd:Sfs; what lives here is the file I/O and the registration.
//
// READ-ONLY MODE EXISTS FOR A REASON. QTEE deletes a container whose keyed
// integrity tag does not verify, so a listener that serves bytes at the wrong
// offset does not merely fail -- it makes QTEE unlink an enrolled template.
// That is unrecoverable. Until a build has been shown to round-trip a
// container, it should serve read-only, where an unlink is refused with EROFS
// and the store cannot be damaged.
bool g_sfsReadOnly = true;
std::string g_sfsRoot = "/var/lib/fingerprintd/sfs";
struct ListenerObject {
qcomtee_object object; // must be first
std::uint32_t id = 0;
qcomtee_object* shared = QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
std::array<std::array<std::byte, 64>, 8> outBufs{};
};
void ListenerRelease(qcomtee_object* object) {
delete reinterpret_cast<ListenerObject*>(object);
}
// Serve one gpfile request out of the shared buffer, in place.
void ServeGpFile(std::span<std::byte> sb) {
namespace sfs = fingerprintd::sfs;
auto req = sfs::ParseRequest(sb);
if (!req) {
std::println(" gpfile: undecodable request");
sfs::WriteReply(sb, EINVAL, 0);
return;
}
if (req->op == sfs::OpConfigPathInit) {
// Asked first, with an empty frame. The answer is LATCHED for the
// whole boot, so an experiment on its value needs a fresh boot.
std::println(" gpfile op 12 (path init) -> {}", sfs::ConfigPathInitReply);
sfs::WriteConfigPathInitReply(sb);
return;
}
auto full = sfs::ResolvePath(g_sfsRoot, req->root, req->path);
if (!full) {
std::println(" gpfile: refusing path '{}' under root {}", req->path, req->root);
sfs::WriteReply(sb, EINVAL, 0);
return;
}
switch (req->action) {
case sfs::Action::Read: {
std::println(" gpfile READ {} off={} len={}", *full, req->offset, req->length);
std::ifstream f(*full, std::ios::binary);
if (!f) { sfs::WriteReply(sb, ENOENT, 0); return; }
if (req->offset > 0) f.seekg(req->offset);
std::size_t want = std::min<std::size_t>(req->length,
sfs::Capacity(sb, sfs::Action::Read));
f.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(sb.data() + sfs::ReadDataOff),
static_cast<std::streamsize>(want));
auto got = static_cast<std::uint32_t>(f.gcount());
std::println(" read {} bytes into +0x{:03x}", got, sfs::ReadDataOff);
sfs::WriteReply(sb, 0, got);
return;
}
case sfs::Action::Write: {
std::println(" gpfile WRITE {} off={} len={}", *full, req->offset, req->length);
if (g_sfsReadOnly) {
std::println(" REFUSED: read-only");
sfs::WriteReply(sb, EROFS, 0);
return;
}
// O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_SYNC and never O_TRUNC: QTEE writes a container
// as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open
// leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs.
int fd = ::open(full->c_str(), O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_SYNC, 0600);
if (fd < 0) { sfs::WriteReply(sb, errno, 0); return; }
if (req->offset > 0 && ::lseek(fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
int e = errno; ::close(fd); sfs::WriteReply(sb, e, 0); return;
}
std::size_t want = std::min<std::size_t>(req->length,
sfs::Capacity(sb, sfs::Action::Write));
std::size_t done = 0;
while (done < want) { // short writes are real; the reference loops
ssize_t n = ::write(fd, sb.data() + sfs::WriteDataOff + done, want - done);
if (n <= 0) break;
done += static_cast<std::size_t>(n);
}
::fsync(fd);
::close(fd);
sfs::WriteReply(sb, 0, static_cast<std::uint32_t>(done));
return;
}
case sfs::Action::Unlink:
std::println(" gpfile UNLINK {}", *full);
if (g_sfsReadOnly) {
std::println(" REFUSED: read-only (this is what protects an enrolled template)");
sfs::WriteReply(sb, EROFS, 0);
return;
}
sfs::WriteReply(sb, ::unlink(full->c_str()) ? errno : 0, 0);
return;
case sfs::Action::Rename: {
auto to = sfs::ResolvePath(g_sfsRoot, req->root, req->path2);
std::println(" gpfile RENAME {} -> {}", *full, to ? *to : std::string("?"));
if (g_sfsReadOnly || !to) { sfs::WriteReply(sb, EROFS, 0); return; }
sfs::WriteReply(sb, ::rename(full->c_str(), to->c_str()) ? errno : 0, 0);
return;
}
}
}
// ---- RPMB
//
// The anti-rollback half. QTEE will not trust a container until it has read
// its counter record out of the UFS device's replay-protected area, and it
// cannot reach the device itself. This serves that read.
//
// A WRITE advances a monotonic counter that can never be moved back, so it is
// refused unless explicitly enabled. Key programming is refused ALWAYS -- the
// RPMB key is one-time programmable and relaying such a frame destroys this
// part's RPMB permanently.
bool g_rpmbWrite = false;
// SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN. Returns 0 on
// success, 1 on unit attention (retryable), -1 on error.
int SecurityProtocol(int fd, bool isIn, std::byte* buf, std::uint32_t len) {
namespace rp = fingerprintd::rpmb;
std::array<unsigned char, 12> cdb{};
std::array<unsigned char, 64> sense{};
cdb[0] = isIn ? 0xA2 : 0xB5;
cdb[1] = rp::SecurityProtocolUfs;
cdb[2] = (rp::SecurityProtocolSpecific >> 8) & 0xFF;
cdb[3] = rp::SecurityProtocolSpecific & 0xFF;
cdb[4] = 0; // INC_512 = 0: the length is in bytes
cdb[6] = (len >> 24) & 0xFF;
cdb[7] = (len >> 16) & 0xFF;
cdb[8] = (len >> 8) & 0xFF;
cdb[9] = len & 0xFF;
sg_io_v4 io{};
io.guard = 'Q';
io.protocol = BSG_PROTOCOL_SCSI;
io.subprotocol = BSG_SUB_PROTOCOL_SCSI_CMD;
io.request_len = cdb.size();
io.request = reinterpret_cast<std::uintptr_t>(cdb.data());
io.max_response_len = sense.size();
io.response = reinterpret_cast<std::uintptr_t>(sense.data());
io.timeout = 15000;
if (isIn) {
io.din_xfer_len = len;
io.din_xferp = reinterpret_cast<std::uintptr_t>(buf);
} else {
io.dout_xfer_len = len;
io.dout_xferp = reinterpret_cast<std::uintptr_t>(buf);
}
if (::ioctl(fd, SG_IO, &io) < 0) {
std::println(" SP{} ioctl failed: {}", isIn ? "I" : "O", ::strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (io.driver_status || io.transport_status || io.device_status) {
unsigned key = sense[2] & 0x0F;
std::println(" SP{} status drv={} trans={} dev={} sense key={} asc=0x{:02x}/{:02x}",
isIn ? "I" : "O", io.driver_status, io.transport_status,
io.device_status, key, sense[12], sense[13]);
// The RPMB LUN raises UNIT ATTENTION on the first command after a
// reset and clears it by reporting it once. Retryable, not an error.
return key == fingerprintd::rpmb::SenseKeyUnitAttention ? 1 : -1;
}
return 0;
}
int SecurityProtocolRetry(int fd, bool isIn, std::byte* buf, std::uint32_t len) {
for (int t = 0; t < 4; t++) {
int rc = SecurityProtocol(fd, isIn, buf, len);
if (rc != 1) return rc;
std::println(" (unit attention cleared, retrying)");
}
return -1;
}
void ServeRpmb(std::span<std::byte> sb) {
namespace rp = fingerprintd::rpmb;
auto req = rp::ParseRequest(sb);
if (!req) { rp::WriteReply(sb, rp::StatusRefused, 0); return; }
if (g_verbose)
std::println(" rpmb op=0x{:x} nblocks={} framesz={} dataoff=0x{:x}",
static_cast<unsigned>(req->op), req->nblocks, req->frameSize,
req->dataOff);
if (!rp::FramesInBounds(sb, *req)) {
std::println(" rpmb: frames out of bounds, refusing");
rp::WriteReply(sb, rp::StatusRefused, 0);
return;
}
// NEVER RELAYED, whatever the write policy says. The RPMB authentication
// key is one-time programmable: reprogramming it destroys this part's RPMB
// permanently and no reflash recovers it. QTEE has no legitimate reason to
// send one.
if (rp::AnyKeyProgramming(sb, *req)) {
std::println(" *** REFUSED: RPMB KEY PROGRAMMING frame. Irreversible. ***");
rp::WriteReply(sb, rp::StatusRefused, 0);
return;
}
if (req->op == rp::Op::Write && !g_rpmbWrite) {
std::println(" rpmb WRITE refused (advances an irreversible counter)");
rp::WriteReply(sb, rp::StatusRefused, 0);
return;
}
if (req->op != rp::Op::Read && req->op != rp::Op::Write) {
rp::WriteReply(sb, rp::StatusRefused, 0);
return;
}
int fd = ::open(std::string(rp::BsgDevice).c_str(), O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
std::println(" rpmb: open {}: {}", rp::BsgDevice, ::strerror(errno));
rp::WriteReply(sb, rp::StatusRefused, 0);
return;
}
std::byte* frames = sb.data() + req->dataOff;
std::uint32_t total = req->nblocks * static_cast<std::uint32_t>(rp::FrameSize);
int rc = -1;
if (req->op == rp::Op::Read) {
// A read posts ONE request frame however large nblocks is, then
// collects nblocks * 512 back.
if (SecurityProtocolRetry(fd, false, frames, rp::FrameSize) == 0)
rc = SecurityProtocolRetry(fd, true, frames, total);
}
::close(fd);
if (rc != 0) {
rp::WriteReply(sb, rp::StatusRefused, 0);
return;
}
if (g_verbose)
std::println(" rpmb read ok: resp=0x{:04x} result=0x{:04x} counter={}",
rp::ReqRespOf(std::span(frames, rp::FrameSize)),
rp::ResultOf(std::span(frames, rp::FrameSize)),
rp::WriteCounterOf(std::span(frames, rp::FrameSize)));
// +0x08 is an OUT parameter QTEE checks against what it expected to be
// transferred; leaving the request's frame size there fails every
// transaction. +0x0c is left exactly as the request supplied it.
rp::WriteReply(sb, rp::StatusOk, rp::BytesTransferred(req->op, req->nblocks));
}
qcomtee_result_t ListenerDispatch(qcomtee_object* object, qcomtee_op_t op,
qcomtee_param* params, int num) {
auto* self = reinterpret_cast<ListenerObject*>(object);
if (g_verbose)
std::println(" *** QTEE called listener 0x{:x} op={} params={}", self->id,
static_cast<unsigned>(op), num);
for (int i = 0; i < num; i++) {
switch (params[i].attr) {
case QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT: {
// addr arrives NULL on the callback path; point it at our own
// storage. Zeros are the answer QTEE expects here.
std::size_t want = std::min<std::size_t>(params[i].ubuf.size,
self->outBufs[0].size());
if (i < 8) {
self->outBufs[i].fill(std::byte{0});
params[i].ubuf.addr = self->outBufs[i].data();
params[i].ubuf.size = want;
}
break;
}
case QCOMTEE_OBJREF_OUTPUT:
// MUST be set. cb_marshal_in leaves .object uninitialised and
// marshal_out then calls typeof() on stack garbage -- a SIGSEGV in
// the supplicant the moment QTEE first dispatches.
params[i].object = QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
// The request itself rides in the registered shared buffer, not in params.
void* addr = qcomtee_memory_object_addr(self->shared);
std::size_t size = qcomtee_memory_object_size(self->shared);
if (addr) {
std::span<std::byte> sb(static_cast<std::byte*>(addr), size);
if (self->id == 0x7000)
ServeGpFile(sb);
else if (self->id == 0x2000)
ServeRpmb(sb);
else
std::println(" (listener 0x{:x}: no handler yet)", self->id);
}
return QCOMTEE_OK;
}
qcomtee_object_ops g_listenerOps = {
/* release */ ListenerRelease,
/* dispatch */ ListenerDispatch,
/* error */ nullptr,
/* supported */ nullptr,
};
// One callback object PER registration. Sharing one across registrations
// overwrites its id and buffer, and every multi-listener result taken that way
// is void -- six sessions of hypotheses rested on exactly that bug.
bool RegisterListener(qcomtee_object* env, std::uint32_t id, std::size_t bufSize) {
qcomtee_object* svc = OpenService(env, fingerprintd::tee::UidListenerCbo);
if (svc == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL) return false;
qcomtee_object* shared = QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
if (qcomtee_memory_object_alloc(bufSize, g_root, &shared)) {
std::println(std::cerr, "listener 0x{:x}: shared buffer alloc failed", id);
return false;
}
auto* lo = new ListenerObject{};
lo->id = id;
lo->shared = shared;
if (qcomtee_object_cb_init(&lo->object, &g_listenerOps, g_root)) {
delete lo;
return false;
}
std::uint32_t lid = id;
qcomtee_param p[3] = {};
p[0].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT; p[0].ubuf.addr = &lid; p[0].ubuf.size = sizeof(lid);
p[1].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_INPUT; p[1].object = &lo->object;
p[2].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_INPUT; p[2].object = shared;
qcomtee_result_t result = 0;
if (qcomtee_object_invoke(svc, 0, p, 3, &result)) {
std::println(std::cerr, "listener 0x{:x}: invoke failed", id);
return false;
}
std::println("listener 0x{:<5x} sb={:<7} -> result={}{}", id, bufSize,
static_cast<int>(result),
result == 0 ? " REGISTERED"
: static_cast<int>(result) == fingerprintd::tee::ResultIdAlreadyTaken
? " (id already taken)" : "");
return result == 0;
}
Own the sensor rail, and run the init chain against it The daemon now powers the sensor and initialises the trustlet against it. On the phone, every step of the chain returning rc=0: gpiochip 'f100000.pinctrl' is /dev/gpiochip5 (168 lines) sensor powered, reset released, irq=1 CMD 0x1006 INIT_SPI rc=0 CMD 0x100a PROBE_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x100b INIT_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x1004 TA_INIT rc=0 CMD 0x1020 WORK_MODE rc=0 CMD 0x100e SYNC_STATISTICS rc=0 GPIO v2 chardev ioctls directly rather than libgpiod, which is on neither the phone nor the sysroot and would be a dependency for three lines. The chip is found by label, and the label is not what the device tree calls it: the node is pinctrl@f100000 so the chardev advertises "f100000.pinctrl", while every DT reference says "tlmm". Matching on "tlmm" finds nothing, which is how the first run failed. There is a second check on the line count, because this SoC has another pinctrl with 23 lines and driving line 75 of the wrong controller is not something you recover from over ssh. The XPU guard is enforced where the line is actually opened, not only asserted in the core. gpio8-11 are the fingerprint SPI pads and touching one is an immediate SError with the phone rebooting where it stands, so a refusal has to sit in front of the ioctl. Owning the rail is what makes the session recoverable at all: one reset buys exactly one trustlet init and a second answers -205, so a failed session needs the rail cycled rather than the chain retried. The harness split these across two processes and every run began by restarting the one holding the rail. CAPTURE_IMAGE answers -201 here and that is correct, not a regression: it needs a shared memory region whose address QTEE patches into the payload, and none is supplied yet. That is the next piece.
2026-09-02 18:24:12 +02:00
// ---- The sensor rail
//
// GPIO v2 chardev ioctls directly: libgpiod is not on the phone and this is
// three lines. The chip is found by LABEL, never by index -- /dev/gpiochipN
// ordering is not stable and driving the wrong controller's pins is the kind
// of mistake that is not recoverable over ssh.
class Sensor {
public:
~Sensor() { PowerOff(); }
bool Open() {
namespace sn = fingerprintd::sensor;
chip_ = FindChip(sn::ChipLabel);
if (chip_ < 0) {
std::println(std::cerr, "no gpiochip labelled '{}'", sn::ChipLabel);
return false;
}
power_ = RequestLine(sn::PowerLine, GPIO_V2_LINE_FLAG_OUTPUT, "fpd-pwr");
reset_ = RequestLine(sn::ResetLine, GPIO_V2_LINE_FLAG_OUTPUT, "fpd-rst");
irq_ = RequestLine(sn::IrqLine, GPIO_V2_LINE_FLAG_INPUT, "fpd-irq");
return power_ >= 0 && reset_ >= 0 && irq_ >= 0;
}
// Rail up, settle, release reset, settle. Both lines are driven low first
// so a warm restart starts where a cold one does.
bool PowerOn() {
namespace sn = fingerprintd::sensor;
if (!Set(power_, 0) || !Set(reset_, 0)) return false;
if (!Set(power_, 1)) return false;
std::this_thread::sleep_for(sn::PowerSettle);
if (!Set(reset_, 1)) return false;
std::this_thread::sleep_for(sn::ResetSettle);
on_ = true;
return true;
}
void PowerOff() {
if (!on_) return;
Set(reset_, 0);
Set(power_, 0);
on_ = false;
}
std::optional<int> ReadIrq() const { return Get(irq_); }
private:
static int FindChip(std::string_view label) {
for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
std::string path = std::format("/dev/gpiochip{}", i);
int fd = ::open(path.c_str(), O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0) continue;
gpiochip_info info{};
if (::ioctl(fd, GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL, &info) == 0
&& label == info.label
&& info.lines >= fingerprintd::sensor::MinChipLines) {
std::println("gpiochip '{}' is {} ({} lines)", info.label, path,
info.lines);
return fd;
}
::close(fd);
}
return -1;
}
int RequestLine(unsigned line, std::uint64_t flags, const char* consumer) {
// The guard, enforced where the line is actually opened rather than
// only asserted in the core. gpio8-11 are XPU-protected and touching
// one is an immediate SError, not an error return.
if (!fingerprintd::sensor::IsSafeLine(line)) {
std::println(std::cerr,
"REFUSING to open gpio{}: XPU-protected fingerprint SPI", line);
return -1;
}
gpio_v2_line_request req{};
req.offsets[0] = line;
req.num_lines = 1;
req.config.flags = flags;
std::snprintf(req.consumer, sizeof(req.consumer), "%s", consumer);
if (::ioctl(chip_, GPIO_V2_GET_LINE_IOCTL, &req) < 0) {
std::println(std::cerr, "gpio{} request failed: {}", line, ::strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return req.fd;
}
static bool Set(int fd, int v) {
if (fd < 0) return false;
gpio_v2_line_values vals{};
vals.mask = 1;
vals.bits = v ? 1 : 0;
return ::ioctl(fd, GPIO_V2_LINE_SET_VALUES_IOCTL, &vals) == 0;
}
static std::optional<int> Get(int fd) {
if (fd < 0) return std::nullopt;
gpio_v2_line_values vals{};
vals.mask = 1;
if (::ioctl(fd, GPIO_V2_LINE_GET_VALUES_IOCTL, &vals) < 0) return std::nullopt;
return static_cast<int>(vals.bits & 1);
}
int chip_ = -1, power_ = -1, reset_ = -1, irq_ = -1;
bool on_ = false;
};
// ---- The trustlet
//
// The loader is IQSEEComCompatAppLoader (UID 122): op 1 loadFromBuffer, op 2
// lookupTA. A stale instance from a crashed run is unloaded first, which is
// what stops a bad experiment costing a reboot.
constexpr const char* TaName = "focal64";
void UnloadStale(qcomtee_object* loader) {
qcomtee_param p[3] = {};
std::array<std::byte, 4> ob{};
p[0].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT;
p[0].ubuf.addr = const_cast<char*>(TaName);
p[0].ubuf.size = std::strlen(TaName);
p[1].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT;
p[1].ubuf.addr = ob.data();
p[1].ubuf.size = ob.size();
p[2].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_OUTPUT;
qcomtee_result_t result = 0;
if (qcomtee_object_invoke(loader, 2, p, 3, &result) || result) {
std::println("lookupTA('{}') -> result={} (nothing to unload)", TaName,
static_cast<int>(result));
return;
}
if (!qcomtee_object_invoke(p[2].object, 2, nullptr, 0, &result))
std::println("unloaded a stale '{}' -> result={}", TaName, static_cast<int>(result));
qcomtee_object_refs_dec(p[2].object);
}
qcomtee_object* LoadTrustlet(qcomtee_object* loader, const std::string& path) {
UnloadStale(loader);
std::ifstream f(path, std::ios::binary);
if (!f) {
std::println(std::cerr, "cannot open {}", path);
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
std::vector<char> image((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(f)),
std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
if (image.empty()) {
std::println(std::cerr, "{} is empty", path);
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
std::array<char, 128> distName{};
qcomtee_param p[4] = {};
p[0].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT;
p[0].ubuf.addr = image.data();
p[0].ubuf.size = image.size();
p[1].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT;
p[1].ubuf.addr = const_cast<char*>(TaName);
p[1].ubuf.size = std::strlen(TaName);
p[2].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT;
p[2].ubuf.addr = distName.data();
p[2].ubuf.size = distName.size();
p[3].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_OUTPUT;
qcomtee_result_t result = 0;
if (qcomtee_object_invoke(loader, 1, p, 4, &result) || result) {
std::println(std::cerr, "loadFromBuffer failed, result={}",
static_cast<int>(result));
return QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
std::println("trustlet loaded from {} ({} bytes), distName='{}'", path,
image.size(), distName.data());
return p[3].object;
}
// sendRequest is op 0 with arity 0x0424: four input buffers, two output, four
// object slots. The request and response buffers go in and come back out; the
// trustlet's own return code rides in the returned request's header.
struct CommandResult {
bool invoked = false;
qcomtee_result_t result = 0;
std::int32_t rc = 0;
std::int32_t metric = 0;
// Only meaningful for REPORT_EVENT: the matcher's verdict rides in the
// returned request's payload.
std::uint32_t gid = 0;
std::uint32_t fid = 0;
std::int32_t samplesRemaining = -1;
};
CommandResult SendCommand(qcomtee_object* app, fingerprintd::ta::Cmd cmd,
std::span<const std::byte> payload) {
namespace ta = fingerprintd::ta;
Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start: client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain calibrating the idle floor (5 samples) idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133 ... idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266 133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces the reference measurement rather than merely producing one. Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither. The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding 0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of mysterious. And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0 returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached, which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another. The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the flags anyway. --verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
namespace tee = fingerprintd::tee;
static std::vector<std::byte> req(8192), rsp(16384), reqOut(8192), rspOut(16384);
std::ranges::fill(rsp, std::byte{0});
std::ranges::fill(reqOut, std::byte{0});
std::ranges::fill(rspOut, std::byte{0});
ta::BuildRequest(req, cmd, payload);
Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start: client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain calibrating the idle floor (5 samples) idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133 ... idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266 133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces the reference measurement rather than merely producing one. Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither. The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding 0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of mysterious. And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0 returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached, which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another. The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the flags anyway. --verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
// CAPTURE_IMAGE's flags word sits at payload+0x18, PAST the declared
// length of 0x14 -- the trustlet range-checks the length to exactly that
// and reads the flags anyway. Without bit 1 or bit 30 it skips
// preprocessing, the classifier and the enrol grouper entirely and returns
// success having done nothing but a raw scan.
if (cmd == ta::Cmd::CaptureImage) {
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < 4; i++)
req[ta::ReqPayloadOff + ta::CaptureFlagsOff + i] =
static_cast<std::byte>((ta::CaptureFlagsEnrol >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF);
}
std::uint32_t is64 = 1;
qcomtee_param p[10] = {};
p[0].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT; p[0].ubuf.addr = req.data(); p[0].ubuf.size = req.size();
p[1].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT; p[1].ubuf.addr = rsp.data(); p[1].ubuf.size = rsp.size();
p[2].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT; p[2].ubuf.addr = nullptr; p[2].ubuf.size = 0;
p[3].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_INPUT; p[3].ubuf.addr = &is64; p[3].ubuf.size = sizeof(is64);
p[4].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT; p[4].ubuf.addr = reqOut.data(); p[4].ubuf.size = reqOut.size();
p[5].attr = QCOMTEE_UBUF_OUTPUT; p[5].ubuf.addr = rspOut.data(); p[5].ubuf.size = rspOut.size();
for (int i = 6; i < 10; i++) {
p[i].attr = QCOMTEE_OBJREF_INPUT;
p[i].object = QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
}
Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start: client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain calibrating the idle floor (5 samples) idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133 ... idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266 133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces the reference measurement rather than merely producing one. Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither. The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding 0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of mysterious. And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0 returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached, which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another. The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the flags anyway. --verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
// A capture needs a real shared memory REGION or the trustlet answers
// -201: it reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE
// only patches an address in there if we name the location in
// embeddedBufOffsets (IB2) and hand it the region in an object slot.
// Without that the pointer is NULL. This is the whole difference between a
// flat metric and a real scan.
//
// Two traps: the offsets array applies to EVERY command in a run, so it is
// scoped to this one command -- patching a pointer into SYNC_CONFIG's
// request breaks it. And an invoke CONSUMES its input objects, so the
// region is allocated fresh each time.
qcomtee_object* region = QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
std::uint32_t offsets = tee::EmbeddedBufOffsetValue;
if (cmd == static_cast<ta::Cmd>(tee::RegionScopedToCommand)) {
if (qcomtee_memory_object_alloc(tee::CaptureRegionSize, g_root, &region)) {
std::println(std::cerr, " memory region alloc failed");
region = QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL;
} else {
void* addr = qcomtee_memory_object_addr(region);
std::size_t sz = qcomtee_memory_object_size(region);
if (g_verbose)
std::println(" region: addr={} size={} offsets=[0x{:x}] slot=IO0",
addr, sz, offsets);
std::memset(addr, 0, sz);
p[2].ubuf.addr = &offsets;
p[2].ubuf.size = sizeof(offsets);
p[6].object = region;
}
}
CommandResult out;
Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start: client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain calibrating the idle floor (5 samples) idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133 ... idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266 133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces the reference measurement rather than merely producing one. Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither. The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding 0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of mysterious. And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0 returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached, which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another. The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the flags anyway. --verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
if (qcomtee_object_invoke(app, tee::AppSendRequestOp, p, 10, &out.result)) {
if (region != QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL)
qcomtee_memory_object_release(region);
return out;
Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start: client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain calibrating the idle floor (5 samples) idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133 ... idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266 133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces the reference measurement rather than merely producing one. Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither. The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding 0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of mysterious. And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0 returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached, which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another. The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the flags anyway. --verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
}
out.invoked = true;
out.rc = ta::ResultCode(reqOut);
out.metric = ta::CaptureMetric(reqOut);
if (cmd == ta::Cmd::ReportEvent) {
out.gid = ta::MatchedGid(reqOut);
out.fid = ta::MatchedFid(reqOut);
out.samplesRemaining = ta::SamplesRemaining(reqOut);
}
Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start: client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain calibrating the idle floor (5 samples) idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133 ... idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266 133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces the reference measurement rather than merely producing one. Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither. The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding 0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of mysterious. And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0 returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached, which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another. The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the flags anyway. --verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
if (g_verbose && cmd == ta::Cmd::CaptureImage) {
std::string hex;
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < 0x30; i++)
hex += std::format("{:02x}{}", std::to_integer<unsigned>(reqOut[i]),
(i % 16 == 15) ? "\n " : " ");
std::println(" reqOut[0x00..0x2f]:\n {}", hex);
}
return out;
}
void Report(fingerprintd::ta::Cmd cmd, const CommandResult& r) {
namespace ta = fingerprintd::ta;
if (!r.invoked) {
std::println(" CMD 0x{:04x} -> INVOKE FAILED", static_cast<unsigned>(cmd));
return;
}
Serve QTEE's storage: the enrolled template loads The whole storage path now works from the daemon. On the phone, against the real store: listener 0x7000 sb=516096 -> result=0 REGISTERED listener 0x2000 sb=25600 -> result=0 REGISTERED SET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid=60 path='/data/vendor_de/0/fpdata' gpfile READ .../1lPrxAL0vXRvWPeDkW2c off=4096 len=252114 ... CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=1 templates loaded: 1 QTEE read a 252114-byte enrolled template through our gpfile listener, verified it, and loaded it. Since QTEE unlinks any container whose keyed integrity tag fails, a load is proof the framing is right -- the read/write offset split, the container chunking, and the RPMB anti-rollback read that has to succeed before QTEE will trust any of it. RPMB is served too: SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN, retrying the unit attention the LUN raises once after a reset. Writes are refused unless asked for, because they advance a counter that cannot be moved back, and key programming is refused unconditionally. The store was served READ-ONLY throughout, which is the point. A listener that serves bytes at the wrong offset does not merely fail: QTEE deletes the container it cannot verify, and that is an enrolled fingerprint gone. Read-only makes a wrong build harmless, so it is the default and writing is opt-in. Two ordering facts, both of which produce -2 with no storage read at all -- indistinguishable from a broken listener: * a template reload needs the device init chain to have run FIRST, because that chain allocates the per-slot array the reload writes through; * SET_ACTIVE_GROUP's second field is a NAMESPACE path, not a filesystem one and not the gid again. The trustlet hashes it into the group's directory name, so it has to match what the store was written under. Also: a positive rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template count there, and running that through the error table printed "unknown" for a good answer.
2026-09-02 18:42:20 +02:00
// A POSITIVE rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template
// count there, so running it through the error table prints "unknown" for
// a perfectly good answer.
if (r.rc > 0)
std::println(" CMD 0x{:04x} -> result={} rc={}", static_cast<unsigned>(cmd),
static_cast<int>(r.result), r.rc);
else
std::println(" CMD 0x{:04x} -> result={} rc={} ({})", static_cast<unsigned>(cmd),
static_cast<int>(r.result), r.rc, ta::StrError(r.rc));
}
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
int Probe() {
namespace tee = fingerprintd::tee;
std::string dev(tee::DevTee);
g_root = qcomtee_object_root_init(dev.c_str(), TeeCall, nullptr, nullptr);
if (g_root == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL) {
std::println(std::cerr, "root object on {}: {}", tee::DevTee,
::strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
std::println("root object on {}", tee::DevTee);
pthread_t th{};
if (pthread_create(&th, nullptr, Supplicant, nullptr) != 0) {
std::println(std::cerr, "supplicant thread failed to start");
return 1;
}
std::uint32_t uid = ::getuid();
qcomtee_object* env = GetClientEnv(uid);
if (env == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL)
return 1;
std::println("client env obtained (uid {}, {}-byte credentials)", uid,
tee::BuildCredentials(uid, 0).size());
Serve QTEE's storage: the enrolled template loads The whole storage path now works from the daemon. On the phone, against the real store: listener 0x7000 sb=516096 -> result=0 REGISTERED listener 0x2000 sb=25600 -> result=0 REGISTERED SET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid=60 path='/data/vendor_de/0/fpdata' gpfile READ .../1lPrxAL0vXRvWPeDkW2c off=4096 len=252114 ... CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=1 templates loaded: 1 QTEE read a 252114-byte enrolled template through our gpfile listener, verified it, and loaded it. Since QTEE unlinks any container whose keyed integrity tag fails, a load is proof the framing is right -- the read/write offset split, the container chunking, and the RPMB anti-rollback read that has to succeed before QTEE will trust any of it. RPMB is served too: SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN, retrying the unit attention the LUN raises once after a reset. Writes are refused unless asked for, because they advance a counter that cannot be moved back, and key programming is refused unconditionally. The store was served READ-ONLY throughout, which is the point. A listener that serves bytes at the wrong offset does not merely fail: QTEE deletes the container it cannot verify, and that is an enrolled fingerprint gone. Read-only makes a wrong build harmless, so it is the default and writing is opt-in. Two ordering facts, both of which produce -2 with no storage read at all -- indistinguishable from a broken listener: * a template reload needs the device init chain to have run FIRST, because that chain allocates the per-slot array the reload writes through; * SET_ACTIVE_GROUP's second field is a NAMESPACE path, not a filesystem one and not the gid again. The trustlet hashes it into the group's directory name, so it has to match what the store was written under. Also: a positive rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template count there, and running that through the error table printed "unknown" for a good answer.
2026-09-02 18:42:20 +02:00
// Register the storage listeners BEFORE loading the trustlet, so any
// storage QTEE wants during init has somewhere to go.
if (g_listeners) {
for (const auto& l : tee::Listeners) {
if (l.id == 10) continue; // never called on the fingerprint path
RegisterListener(env, l.id, l.bufferSize);
}
std::println("SFS root {} ({})", g_sfsRoot,
g_sfsReadOnly ? "READ-ONLY" : "writable");
}
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
qcomtee_object* loader = OpenService(env, tee::UidQseecomCompatAppLoader);
if (loader == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL)
return 1;
std::println("QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID {}) opened",
tee::UidQseecomCompatAppLoader);
qcomtee_object* app = LoadTrustlet(loader, g_taPath);
if (app == QCOMTEE_OBJECT_NULL)
return 1;
// SYNC_CONFIG first, always. The trustlet reads its whole configuration
// from this one JSON payload, and two keys in it are load-bearing:
// algorithm.enrolling_overlap_intervals must be PRESENT (its default is
// the empty string, which faults the trustlet's own sscanf), and
// device.preferred_device_id selects the chip driver.
std::ifstream cf(g_cfgPath);
if (!cf) {
std::println(std::cerr, "cannot open config {}", g_cfgPath);
return 1;
}
std::string json((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(cf)),
std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
// The trustlet wants the terminating NUL counted.
std::vector<std::byte> cfg(json.size() + 1, std::byte{0});
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < json.size(); i++)
cfg[i] = static_cast<std::byte>(json[i]);
std::println("config {}: {} bytes", g_cfgPath, cfg.size());
auto r = SendCommand(app, fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::SyncConfig, cfg);
Report(fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::SyncConfig, r);
if (!r.invoked || r.result != 0 || r.rc != 0) {
std::println(std::cerr, "SYNC_CONFIG did not succeed; stopping here");
return 1;
}
Own the sensor rail, and run the init chain against it The daemon now powers the sensor and initialises the trustlet against it. On the phone, every step of the chain returning rc=0: gpiochip 'f100000.pinctrl' is /dev/gpiochip5 (168 lines) sensor powered, reset released, irq=1 CMD 0x1006 INIT_SPI rc=0 CMD 0x100a PROBE_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x100b INIT_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x1004 TA_INIT rc=0 CMD 0x1020 WORK_MODE rc=0 CMD 0x100e SYNC_STATISTICS rc=0 GPIO v2 chardev ioctls directly rather than libgpiod, which is on neither the phone nor the sysroot and would be a dependency for three lines. The chip is found by label, and the label is not what the device tree calls it: the node is pinctrl@f100000 so the chardev advertises "f100000.pinctrl", while every DT reference says "tlmm". Matching on "tlmm" finds nothing, which is how the first run failed. There is a second check on the line count, because this SoC has another pinctrl with 23 lines and driving line 75 of the wrong controller is not something you recover from over ssh. The XPU guard is enforced where the line is actually opened, not only asserted in the core. gpio8-11 are the fingerprint SPI pads and touching one is an immediate SError with the phone rebooting where it stands, so a refusal has to sit in front of the ioctl. Owning the rail is what makes the session recoverable at all: one reset buys exactly one trustlet init and a second answers -205, so a failed session needs the rail cycled rather than the chain retried. The harness split these across two processes and every run began by restarting the one holding the rail. CAPTURE_IMAGE answers -201 here and that is correct, not a regression: it needs a shared memory region whose address QTEE patches into the payload, and none is supplied yet. That is the next piece.
2026-09-02 18:24:12 +02:00
// ---- The sensor, and the init chain that needs it powered
Sensor sensor;
if (!sensor.Open()) {
std::println(std::cerr, "sensor lines unavailable; stopping before init");
return 1;
}
if (!sensor.PowerOn()) {
std::println(std::cerr, "sensor power-up failed");
return 1;
}
auto irq = sensor.ReadIrq();
std::println("sensor powered, reset released, irq={}",
irq ? std::to_string(*irq) : std::string("?"));
// The chain, in order. Every step answers rc=0 on a healthy sensor and the
// last one is not optional: without SYNC_STATISTICS the trustlet's
// g_statistics stays NULL and the first enrol frame that gets far enough
// writes through it.
//
// One reset buys one init. If this fails, the rail has to go down and come
// back up -- re-running the chain answers -205.
bool ok = true;
for (fingerprintd::ta::Cmd c : fingerprintd::ta::InitChain) {
std::vector<std::byte> payload;
if (c == fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::WorkMode) {
// WORK_MODE takes a u32 mode; 1 = WAIT_TOUCH.
payload.assign(0x10, std::byte{0});
payload[0] = static_cast<std::byte>(
static_cast<std::uint32_t>(fingerprintd::ta::WorkMode::WaitTouch));
} else if (c == fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::SyncStatistics) {
payload.assign(fingerprintd::ta::SyncStatisticsPayloadSize, std::byte{0});
}
auto ir = SendCommand(app, c, payload);
Report(c, ir);
if (!ir.invoked || ir.result != 0 || ir.rc != 0) {
ok = false;
if (ir.rc == fingerprintd::sensor::RcDeviceNotFound)
std::println(std::cerr,
" -205: a second init in one power cycle. "
"Power-cycle the rail, do not retry.");
break;
}
}
if (!ok) {
std::println(std::cerr, "init chain did not complete");
return 1;
}
Serve QTEE's storage: the enrolled template loads The whole storage path now works from the daemon. On the phone, against the real store: listener 0x7000 sb=516096 -> result=0 REGISTERED listener 0x2000 sb=25600 -> result=0 REGISTERED SET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid=60 path='/data/vendor_de/0/fpdata' gpfile READ .../1lPrxAL0vXRvWPeDkW2c off=4096 len=252114 ... CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=1 templates loaded: 1 QTEE read a 252114-byte enrolled template through our gpfile listener, verified it, and loaded it. Since QTEE unlinks any container whose keyed integrity tag fails, a load is proof the framing is right -- the read/write offset split, the container chunking, and the RPMB anti-rollback read that has to succeed before QTEE will trust any of it. RPMB is served too: SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN, retrying the unit attention the LUN raises once after a reset. Writes are refused unless asked for, because they advance a counter that cannot be moved back, and key programming is refused unconditionally. The store was served READ-ONLY throughout, which is the point. A listener that serves bytes at the wrong offset does not merely fail: QTEE deletes the container it cannot verify, and that is an enrolled fingerprint gone. Read-only makes a wrong build harmless, so it is the default and writing is opt-in. Two ordering facts, both of which produce -2 with no storage read at all -- indistinguishable from a broken listener: * a template reload needs the device init chain to have run FIRST, because that chain allocates the per-slot array the reload writes through; * SET_ACTIVE_GROUP's second field is a NAMESPACE path, not a filesystem one and not the gid again. The trustlet hashes it into the group's directory name, so it has to match what the store was written under. Also: a positive rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template count there, and running that through the error table printed "unknown" for a good answer.
2026-09-02 18:42:20 +02:00
// NOW the store can be read. A template reload needs the device init
// chain to have run first: the per-slot enroll-template array is allocated
// by that chain, and without it FtInitEnrollTplData writes through a NULL
// the moment a template becomes reachable. Running SET_ACTIVE_GROUP before
// the chain answers -2 and loads nothing, which reads like a missing
// container and is an ordering bug.
if (g_listeners) {
auto sag = fingerprintd::ta::BuildSetActiveGroup(g_gid);
std::println("\nSET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid={} path='{}'", g_gid,
fingerprintd::ta::GroupNamespacePath);
auto g = SendCommand(app, fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::SetActiveGroup, sag);
Report(fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::SetActiveGroup, g);
auto e = SendCommand(app, fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::Enumerate, {});
Report(fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::Enumerate, e);
std::println(" templates loaded: {}", e.rc);
}
Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start: client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain calibrating the idle floor (5 samples) idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133 ... idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266 133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces the reference measurement rather than merely producing one. Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither. The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding 0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of mysterious. And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0 returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached, which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another. The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the flags anyway. --verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
// With the sensor initialised and a region supplied, a capture returns a
// real metric. No finger is needed to establish the idle floor, and the
// floor is the only meaningful reference: the metric is per frame and
// drifts, so a fixed threshold is wrong by construction.
fingerprintd::engine::Baseline baseline;
std::println("calibrating the idle floor ({} samples)",
fingerprintd::engine::Baseline::DefaultSamples);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < fingerprintd::engine::Baseline::DefaultSamples; i++) {
std::vector<std::byte> cap(fingerprintd::ta::CaptureDeclaredLen);
fingerprintd::ta::BuildCapturePayload(cap);
auto c = SendCommand(app, fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::CaptureImage, cap);
if (!c.invoked || c.result != 0) {
Report(fingerprintd::ta::Cmd::CaptureImage, c);
std::println(std::cerr, "capture failed during calibration");
return 1;
}
std::println(" idle {}/{}: rc={} metric={}", i + 1,
fingerprintd::engine::Baseline::DefaultSamples, c.rc, c.metric);
baseline.Observe(c.metric);
}
if (!baseline.Ready()) {
std::println(std::cerr, "baseline did not calibrate (floor stayed 0)");
return 1;
}
std::println("idle floor = {}, finger threshold = {}", baseline.Floor(),
baseline.Threshold());
Own the sensor rail, and run the init chain against it The daemon now powers the sensor and initialises the trustlet against it. On the phone, every step of the chain returning rc=0: gpiochip 'f100000.pinctrl' is /dev/gpiochip5 (168 lines) sensor powered, reset released, irq=1 CMD 0x1006 INIT_SPI rc=0 CMD 0x100a PROBE_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x100b INIT_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x1004 TA_INIT rc=0 CMD 0x1020 WORK_MODE rc=0 CMD 0x100e SYNC_STATISTICS rc=0 GPIO v2 chardev ioctls directly rather than libgpiod, which is on neither the phone nor the sysroot and would be a dependency for three lines. The chip is found by label, and the label is not what the device tree calls it: the node is pinctrl@f100000 so the chardev advertises "f100000.pinctrl", while every DT reference says "tlmm". Matching on "tlmm" finds nothing, which is how the first run failed. There is a second check on the line count, because this SoC has another pinctrl with 23 lines and driving line 75 of the wrong controller is not something you recover from over ssh. The XPU guard is enforced where the line is actually opened, not only asserted in the core. gpio8-11 are the fingerprint SPI pads and touching one is an immediate SError with the phone rebooting where it stands, so a refusal has to sit in front of the ioctl. Owning the rail is what makes the session recoverable at all: one reset buys exactly one trustlet init and a second answers -205, so a failed session needs the rail cycled rather than the chain retried. The harness split these across two processes and every run began by restarting the one holding the rail. CAPTURE_IMAGE answers -201 here and that is correct, not a regression: it needs a shared memory region whose address QTEE patches into the payload, and none is supplied yet. That is the next piece.
2026-09-02 18:24:12 +02:00
// ---- Authentication
//
// Needs no writes of any kind: no SAVE_DATA, no RPMB write, no SFS write.
// So it runs safely against an existing template with the store read-only,
// which is what makes it the right thing to try before enrolment.
if (g_auth) {
namespace ta = fingerprintd::ta;
namespace en = fingerprintd::engine;
// AUTHENTICATE arms the scan session. Its gid must match the one
// SET_ACTIVE_GROUP used or the trustlet answers -200.
std::vector<std::byte> au(ta::AuthPayloadSize);
ta::BuildAuthPayload(au, 1, g_gid);
std::println("\nAUTHENTICATE gid={}", g_gid);
auto a = SendCommand(app, ta::Cmd::Authenticate, au);
Report(ta::Cmd::Authenticate, a);
if (!a.invoked || a.result != 0 || a.rc != 0) {
std::println(std::cerr, "could not arm authentication");
return 1;
}
for (int c = 3; c > 0; c--) {
std::println("*** press and lift your finger in {}... ***", c);
std::fflush(stdout);
std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::seconds(1));
}
std::println("\n*** GO -- {} frames, about {} seconds ***\n", g_frames,
(g_frames * g_frameGapMs) / 1000);
en::TouchTracker tracker;
en::AuthTally tally;
for (int i = 0; i < g_frames; i++) {
std::vector<std::byte> q(0x10, std::byte{0});
SendCommand(app, ta::Cmd::QueryEventStatus, q);
std::vector<std::byte> cap(ta::CaptureDeclaredLen);
ta::BuildCapturePayload(cap);
auto c = SendCommand(app, ta::Cmd::CaptureImage, cap);
bool finger = baseline.IsFinger(c.metric);
auto events = tracker.Observe(finger, en::Mode::Authenticate);
std::string verdicts;
for (ta::Event ev : events) {
std::vector<std::byte> evbuf(ta::EventContextSize);
ta::BuildEventContext(evbuf, { .event = ev });
// Poison the fid field before the call. A zero-initialised
// buffer cannot tell "the matcher never ran" from "the matcher
// ran and rejected the finger" -- the failure path writes zero
// there too, so zero is ambiguous and 0xAAAAAAAA is not.
ta::PoisonFid(std::span(evbuf).subspan(ta::ResponsePayloadOff));
auto r = SendCommand(app, ta::Cmd::ReportEvent, evbuf);
if (!r.invoked) continue;
ta::Verdict v = ta::Classify(r.rc, r.fid);
tally.Observe(v, finger);
verdicts += std::format(" {}", [&] {
switch (v) {
case ta::Verdict::Match:
return std::format("*** MATCH *** gid={} fid={}", r.gid, r.fid);
case ta::Verdict::Rejected: return std::string("REJECTED");
case ta::Verdict::NotIdentifiedYet: return std::string("not identified yet");
case ta::Verdict::MatcherNeverRan: return std::string("released");
}
return std::string("?");
}());
}
std::println(" frame {:2}/{}: metric={:<4}{}{}", i + 1, g_frames, c.metric,
finger ? " FINGER" : " ", verdicts);
std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(g_frameGapMs));
}
// Only a terminal verdict is an attempt. Counting rescan frames as
// rejections invents failures that never happened.
std::println("\n=== {} MATCH / {} REJECTED over {} terminal frames ===",
tally.Matches(), tally.Rejections(), tally.TerminalFrames());
std::println(" ({} answered 'not identified yet', {} never reached the matcher)",
tally.NotIdentifiedYet(), tally.NeverRan());
if (tally.Presses() > 0)
std::println(" presses: {} total, {} reached a verdict, {} matched",
tally.Presses(), tally.PressesDecided(), tally.PressesMatched());
std::println(" {}", tally.Identified() ? "FINGER IDENTIFIED" : "no match");
}
Own the sensor rail, and run the init chain against it The daemon now powers the sensor and initialises the trustlet against it. On the phone, every step of the chain returning rc=0: gpiochip 'f100000.pinctrl' is /dev/gpiochip5 (168 lines) sensor powered, reset released, irq=1 CMD 0x1006 INIT_SPI rc=0 CMD 0x100a PROBE_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x100b INIT_DEVICE rc=0 CMD 0x1004 TA_INIT rc=0 CMD 0x1020 WORK_MODE rc=0 CMD 0x100e SYNC_STATISTICS rc=0 GPIO v2 chardev ioctls directly rather than libgpiod, which is on neither the phone nor the sysroot and would be a dependency for three lines. The chip is found by label, and the label is not what the device tree calls it: the node is pinctrl@f100000 so the chardev advertises "f100000.pinctrl", while every DT reference says "tlmm". Matching on "tlmm" finds nothing, which is how the first run failed. There is a second check on the line count, because this SoC has another pinctrl with 23 lines and driving line 75 of the wrong controller is not something you recover from over ssh. The XPU guard is enforced where the line is actually opened, not only asserted in the core. gpio8-11 are the fingerprint SPI pads and touching one is an immediate SError with the phone rebooting where it stands, so a refusal has to sit in front of the ioctl. Owning the rail is what makes the session recoverable at all: one reset buys exactly one trustlet init and a second answers -205, so a failed session needs the rail cycled rather than the chain retried. The harness split these across two processes and every run began by restarting the one holding the rail. CAPTURE_IMAGE answers -201 here and that is correct, not a regression: it needs a shared memory region whose address QTEE patches into the payload, and none is supplied yet. That is the next piece.
2026-09-02 18:24:12 +02:00
std::println("\ntrustlet initialised against a powered sensor.");
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
pthread_cancel(th);
pthread_join(th, nullptr);
return 0;
}
} // namespace
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
std::span<char*> args(argv, static_cast<std::size_t>(argc));
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
bool probe = false;
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
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for (std::string_view a : args.subspan(1)) {
if (a == "--version") {
std::println("fingerprintd {}", Version);
return 0;
}
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
if (a == "--probe-tee") probe = true;
if (a.starts_with("--ta=")) g_taPath = a.substr(5);
if (a.starts_with("--config=")) g_cfgPath = a.substr(9);
Capture works: idle floor 133, matching the reference measurement The finger-free path is complete. On the phone, from a cold start: client env -> loader -> trustlet -> config -> sensor rail -> init chain calibrating the idle floor (5 samples) idle 1/5: rc=-11 metric=133 ... idle floor = 133, finger threshold = 266 133 is the number the journal records for this sensor, so the port reproduces the reference measurement rather than merely producing one. Two things had to be right at once, and the first attempt had neither. The memory region: CAPTURE_IMAGE reads an output-buffer pointer out of payload+0x00, and QTEE only patches an address there if the location is named in embeddedBufOffsets and the region handed over in an object slot. The instrumented dump shows it working -- payload+0x00 came back holding 0x088db98000 -- which is what made the remaining failure legible instead of mysterious. And two fields inside the capture payload that an all-zero request leaves unset: a frame count at +0x0c and a branch selector at +0x10. Selector 0 returns metric 0. Sending zeros gets -201 with the region correctly attached, which reads exactly like a broken region and is not one. They are named constants now, with the note that the metric is PER FRAME so a threshold calibrated at one frame count means nothing at another. The flags word at payload+0x18 stays past the declared length of 0x14 on purpose: the trustlet range-checks that length to exactly 0x14 and reads the flags anyway. --verbose keeps the region and reqOut dumps, which is what turned this from guesswork into reading.
2026-09-02 18:27:35 +02:00
if (a == "--verbose") g_verbose = true;
Serve QTEE's storage: the enrolled template loads The whole storage path now works from the daemon. On the phone, against the real store: listener 0x7000 sb=516096 -> result=0 REGISTERED listener 0x2000 sb=25600 -> result=0 REGISTERED SET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid=60 path='/data/vendor_de/0/fpdata' gpfile READ .../1lPrxAL0vXRvWPeDkW2c off=4096 len=252114 ... CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=1 templates loaded: 1 QTEE read a 252114-byte enrolled template through our gpfile listener, verified it, and loaded it. Since QTEE unlinks any container whose keyed integrity tag fails, a load is proof the framing is right -- the read/write offset split, the container chunking, and the RPMB anti-rollback read that has to succeed before QTEE will trust any of it. RPMB is served too: SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN, retrying the unit attention the LUN raises once after a reset. Writes are refused unless asked for, because they advance a counter that cannot be moved back, and key programming is refused unconditionally. The store was served READ-ONLY throughout, which is the point. A listener that serves bytes at the wrong offset does not merely fail: QTEE deletes the container it cannot verify, and that is an enrolled fingerprint gone. Read-only makes a wrong build harmless, so it is the default and writing is opt-in. Two ordering facts, both of which produce -2 with no storage read at all -- indistinguishable from a broken listener: * a template reload needs the device init chain to have run FIRST, because that chain allocates the per-slot array the reload writes through; * SET_ACTIVE_GROUP's second field is a NAMESPACE path, not a filesystem one and not the gid again. The trustlet hashes it into the group's directory name, so it has to match what the store was written under. Also: a positive rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template count there, and running that through the error table printed "unknown" for a good answer.
2026-09-02 18:42:20 +02:00
if (a == "--listeners") g_listeners = true;
// Serving the store writable lets QTEE UNLINK a container it rejects,
// which destroys an enrolled template. Opt in explicitly.
if (a == "--sfs-writable") g_sfsReadOnly = false;
if (a == "--rpmb-write") g_rpmbWrite = true;
if (a == "--auth") { g_auth = true; g_listeners = true; }
if (a.starts_with("--frames=")) g_frames = std::stoi(std::string(a.substr(9)));
Serve QTEE's storage: the enrolled template loads The whole storage path now works from the daemon. On the phone, against the real store: listener 0x7000 sb=516096 -> result=0 REGISTERED listener 0x2000 sb=25600 -> result=0 REGISTERED SET_ACTIVE_GROUP gid=60 path='/data/vendor_de/0/fpdata' gpfile READ .../1lPrxAL0vXRvWPeDkW2c off=4096 len=252114 ... CMD 0x2005 -> result=0 rc=1 templates loaded: 1 QTEE read a 252114-byte enrolled template through our gpfile listener, verified it, and loaded it. Since QTEE unlinks any container whose keyed integrity tag fails, a load is proof the framing is right -- the read/write offset split, the container chunking, and the RPMB anti-rollback read that has to succeed before QTEE will trust any of it. RPMB is served too: SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/OUT against the RPMB well-known LUN, retrying the unit attention the LUN raises once after a reset. Writes are refused unless asked for, because they advance a counter that cannot be moved back, and key programming is refused unconditionally. The store was served READ-ONLY throughout, which is the point. A listener that serves bytes at the wrong offset does not merely fail: QTEE deletes the container it cannot verify, and that is an enrolled fingerprint gone. Read-only makes a wrong build harmless, so it is the default and writing is opt-in. Two ordering facts, both of which produce -2 with no storage read at all -- indistinguishable from a broken listener: * a template reload needs the device init chain to have run FIRST, because that chain allocates the per-slot array the reload writes through; * SET_ACTIVE_GROUP's second field is a NAMESPACE path, not a filesystem one and not the gid again. The trustlet hashes it into the group's directory name, so it has to match what the store was written under. Also: a positive rc is not an error code. ENUMERATE returns the template count there, and running that through the error table printed "unknown" for a good answer.
2026-09-02 18:42:20 +02:00
if (a.starts_with("--sfs-root=")) g_sfsRoot = a.substr(11);
if (a.starts_with("--gid=")) g_gid = static_cast<std::uint32_t>(
std::stoul(std::string(a.substr(6))));
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
}
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
if (probe)
return Probe();
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
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std::println(std::cerr,
Reach QTEE: credentials, client env and the app loader, with no QCBOR fingerprintd's own code now talks to QTEE. On the phone: root object on /dev/tee0 client env obtained (uid 0, 13-byte credentials) QSEECOM-compat app loader (UID 122) opened The credentials object is ours rather than libqcomtee's. Upstream's exists only to build a thirteen-byte CBOR map and drags in QCBOR to do it, so packaging/make-libqcomtee.sh compiles the two sources that matter and drops credentials_obj.c entirely -- nothing else references it, and the library then has no dependency beyond libc. The map is built in Fingerprintd:Tee where it is pinned byte-for-byte against the string verified on-device, and the object's two-op read protocol is served here. Three interop details, all of which cost a build cycle: * libqcomtee's headers carry no extern "C" guard, having only ever been consumed from C, so everything came out C++-mangled. They also pull in <stdatomic.h> and <stdio.h>, which under libc++ drag in templates that may not appear inside extern "C" -- so those are included first. * tee_call_t's second parameter is unsigned long on glibc and int on musl. The native build is glibc and the phone is musl; both forms are compiled. * On the callback path a UBUF_OUTPUT param arrives with addr = NULL. The dispatcher supplies the buffer, so a handler POINTS the param at its own storage rather than writing through the incoming address. Doing the latter is a null dereference that takes the supplicant thread with it, which is how the first run against real QTEE ended -- with the correct behaviour already spelled out in the module comment above the code that ignored it. That comment now says so in as many words.
2026-09-02 18:02:28 +02:00
"fingerprintd {}: no runtime yet. --probe-tee reaches QTEE; "
"`crafter-build test` covers the core.", Version);
Initial commit: the gpfile wire format, pinned by two real containers fingerprintd will own the FP6's fingerprint sensor: the rail, the QTEE session, the storage callbacks QTEE makes back into the normal world, and net.reactivated.Fprint so pam_fprintd and the desktop need no changes. None of that runs yet. What is here is the first core module and the machinery around it. Fingerprintd:Sfs is the gpfile listener's frame -- the callback that carries 47 of 66 storage requests during an enrolment. It is parse, reply and root mapping only: no file I/O, no TEE, no allocation of the shared buffer. The daemon shell supplies those, which is what lets every byte-level decision be tested on a dev box with no phone. The module exists mainly to hold one fact. READ answers at req+0x00c and WRITE reads its payload from req+0x110, because the frame is a union: a WRITE still needs its path while the payload is copied out, so it sits past the 256-byte path field, while a READ has consumed the path and packs its reply over it. Conflating them is wrong in both directions with the same symptom -- the container does not round-trip, QTEE's HMAC check fails, and the file is unlinked as tampered on the next session. So the tests do not assert the constants against themselves. They load two real containers off the phone -- one written correctly, one written with the offsets conflated -- and re-derive the bug: the broken one opens with ASCII path text rather than a binary HMAC, that text is the group name from character 8 because the read offset is 8 bytes into the path field, and the real container sits exactly 0x104 further in. Then a write-store-read round trip must be the identity, and the same round trip through a single offset must not be. O_TRUNC gets a static_assert of its own. QTEE writes a container as write(0,4096), write(4096,N), write(0,4096), so truncating on open leaves 4096 bytes where a 258850-byte template belongs; it unlinks a file it means to shorten rather than relying on the opener. Verified by mutation: conflating the offsets, making DataOffset return the read offset for writes, and setting O_TRUNC each fail the suite.
2026-09-02 16:02:46 +02:00
return 1;
}