ipsec, engine, imsd: the state file records the P-CSCF and a resume follows the kernel's SA peer
A resume compared PCSCF= against the kernel's SAs and, when they did not match, registered fresh without a word — a second initial REGISTER from an address whose registration is live; on KPN a fresh pair to the same P-CSCF meets the 21-minute refusal that costs the live registration (§13), what another P-CSCF does with it is unmeasured. The registration was made to whatever P-CSCF the SAs name (the SA setup takes imsd's previous pair out first), so that is where a resume belongs: SaPeer reads it from the dir-out transport policies — the one address a reqid-1 and a reqid-2 policy both name, each with imsd's fixed protected port as its selector's sport (reqid and mode alone are anyone's): the state text cannot tell the UE from the P-CSCF, a lone policy is not ours and a VPN's beside the pair changes nothing — TryResume resumes there, routes it, and says so when PCSCF= differs; the next fresh registration moves to PCSCF= and moves back when it fails before the SA setup and the old registration still stands (its address still on the link), as it already did between addresses, and its fallback Route is the P-CSCF it registers at, set before the 200's Service-Route is looked for — an empty Service-Route value counts as none — so a move never keeps the previous node's route. A file left by an attempt that got through the SA setup and did not live to record — to this or another P-CSCF — is recognised by its SA pair: the file's spi_uc/spi_us (a 0.3.x file carries them too) against the kernel's (FileNamesAnotherPair, Imsd:Ipsec, pinned in tests/Ipsec), instead of resumed with the wrong dialog; the state file gains pcscf, named in that line. Both fresh paths — the bring-up's and recovery's — now set their target themselves: with no PCSCF=, a bring-up that did not resume fails with its own message, and since no fresh one follows: a resumable pair whose attempt failed stays for the restart to resume, a pair nothing can resume — one the engine's rule wrote off during the attempt among them, a refresh refused with a 403 that carries a Retry-After or a binding a NOTIFY terminated under the re-REGISTER wait, decided once after both catch arms by its verdict (Reconnectable(), and with no fresh target Fresh(): a 401, a refusal with a Retry-After, the second refusal — with no fresh target every refusal reaches the reducer and its count travels in the holds, so the restart's refusal is the second, while with a target only a Retry-After does, as before — a refusal without one is not counted and the fresh registration follows at once; without the count a refused no-target resume would re-REGISTER on the same Call-ID at every RestartSec, the F16 loop) — is removed so the next bring-up finds nothing — and a recovery step that needs one restarts the daemon; the "PCSCF not set" check at the top of BringUp is gone, so a registration can be resumed with no setting at all. Three journal lines of the fresh-target path change with it: `resume connect failed; falling back to fresh` and `state file transport differs from SIP_TRANSPORT; fresh` end in `the next registration is a fresh one`, and a resume the engine writes off (a 403 with a Retry-After, a binding a NOTIFY terminated under the wait) logs `resume failed: … — written off by the network: the next registration is a fresh one` (§7.8). `no reg state file; resume falls back to fresh` keeps its text with a fresh target and ends in `nothing can resume it: the pair is removed` without one; the new `the state file names another SA pair (0x…/0x…[ to X]) than the kernel's (0x…/0x… to Y): another attempt's; …` line takes the same two tails. Tested: crafter-build test, 7 passed (tests/Engine: the refusal count's travel through the holds); the resume on the SA peer with the fresh target absent in builds of this series on the dev phone (KPN), and the no-target bring-up there with a resume that failed on a transport mismatch (the pair kept, the restart resumed) and with the state file removed (the pair removed, the next bring-up found nothing); the two dead-resume lines' no-target tail — a missing file, a file with another pair's SPIs — and the pair's removal on the tip's host build (bench 23f: a fake modem on PATH, a real xfrm in a namespace; a file with the pair's SPIs but another P-CSCF's address passes the check and the resume runs — `RESUME via existing SA`, the connect then failing in the namespace); on the dev phone (bench 41, the tip's build) a resume on a file without its pcscf key, the live pair's SPIs.
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7 changed files with 448 additions and 84 deletions
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@ -19,11 +19,14 @@ SPIs in use, which a reregistration's new SPIs must differ from (and the
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state file falls back to) — and a one-mechanism Security-Server value that
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stands in for the Security-Verify when the state file holds no list for the
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SA pair in the kernel (`ChooseResumeSecurityVerify` decides; since 0.3.12
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the 401's own list is stored there). Since 1.0.0 also
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`OwnXfrmDeleteCommands`: the deletes by exact key of what two rules select —
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the policies carrying imsd's fingerprint and the reqid-1/2 transport-mode ESP
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states in their direction or on the UE's ims-PDN address, whoever installed
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them (§12).
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the 401's own list is stored there). Since 1.0.0 also `SaPeer`: the P-CSCF
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the kernel's pair is to, read from the `dir out` policies that carry imsd's
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fingerprint; `OwnXfrmDeleteCommands`, the deletes by exact key of what two
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rules select — the policies carrying imsd's fingerprint and the reqid-1/2
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transport-mode ESP states in their direction or on the UE's ims-PDN address,
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whoever installed them (§12); and `FileNamesAnotherPair`, whether a state
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file's spi_uc/spi_us name the pair the kernel holds (unknown on either side
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decides nothing).
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Pure std C++ (the shell runs the commands and captures the text). Command
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shapes and the parser are pinned by tests/Ipsec.
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@ -461,6 +464,19 @@ export namespace imsd::ipsec {
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return r;
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}
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// Whether a state file was written for the SA pair the kernel holds: the
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// file's spi_uc/spi_us (the UE's inbound SPIs — drawn per fresh attempt,
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// kept by a re-REGISTER, written back by a resume) against the pair's. A
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// file another attempt left behind — one that got through the SA setup
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// and did not live to record, to this or another P-CSCF — names another
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// pair, and its dialog is not this pair's. Unknown on either side (a
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// file from before the keys, a 0 from a missing inbound state) decides
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// nothing.
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bool FileNamesAnotherPair(std::optional<long> fileUc, std::optional<long> fileUs, std::uint32_t saUc, std::uint32_t saUs) {
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if (!fileUc || !fileUs || *fileUc <= 0 || *fileUs <= 0 || saUc == 0 || saUs == 0) return false;
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return static_cast<std::uint32_t>(*fileUc) != saUc || static_cast<std::uint32_t>(*fileUs) != saUs;
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}
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// Every local address holding an SA to the P-CSCF, once each, in kernel
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// order: where a registration made on another address of the link (the
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// kernel's temporary one, before 0.3.10 — ims ledger F18) still lives.
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@ -475,6 +491,37 @@ export namespace imsd::ipsec {
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return locals;
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}
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// The P-CSCF the kernel's SAs are to: the one address that a `dir out`
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// policy of imsd's own with reqid 1 and one with reqid 2 both name
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// (detail::OwnPolicy: transport mode, the fixed protected port as the
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// selector's sport — reqid and mode alone are anyone's) — exactly the pair
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// BuildSetupCommands installs. The state text cannot
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// tell the two ends apart (the UE is a `dst` there too). A foreign policy
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// beside the pair (a VPN's: tunnel mode, another destination, whatever
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// its reqid) changes nothing; a lone policy is not a registration, and
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// two addresses each carrying both reqids are not one pair to tell
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// apart: nullopt then, and when there are none.
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std::optional<std::string> SaPeer(std::string_view policyText) {
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std::vector<std::string> r1;
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std::vector<std::string> r2;
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for (std::string_view b : detail::SrcBlocks(policyText)) {
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if (b.find("dir out") == std::string_view::npos || !detail::OwnPolicy(b)) continue;
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auto reqid = detail::ParseDec(detail::TokenAfter(b, "reqid "));
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std::string_view dstTok = detail::TokenAfter(b, "dst ");
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const std::string dst = imsd::util::CanonicalAddr(dstTok.substr(0, dstTok.find('/')));
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if (dst.empty()) continue;
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std::vector<std::string>& set = *reqid == 1 ? r1 : r2;
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if (std::ranges::find(set, dst) == set.end()) set.push_back(dst);
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}
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std::optional<std::string> peer;
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for (const std::string& d : r1) {
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if (std::ranges::find(r2, d) == r2.end()) continue;
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if (peer) return std::nullopt;
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peer = d;
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}
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return peer;
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}
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// The `ip xfrm … delete` argv lists that take the entries two rules select
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// out of the kernel as the two texts show it: every policy
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// of imsd's own (detail::OwnPolicy — transport mode, reqid 1 or 2, the
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@ -489,7 +536,8 @@ export namespace imsd::ipsec {
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// Everything else — a policy-based
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// VPN's tunnel entries, another transport-mode user's on other ports and
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// addresses — stays: the fresh registration's SA setup runs these before
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// BuildSetupCommands' adds, and flushes nothing (§12). Residual: a
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// BuildSetupCommands' adds, the dead pair's teardown (RemoveDeadPair,
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// main.cpp) runs them alone, and neither flushes (§12). Residual: a
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// transport-mode policy with reqid 1 and the UE-side port 45061, or reqid
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// 2 and 45062, alone or paired, carries the fingerprint and goes with the
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// reqid-1/2 transport-mode ESP states in its direction, and a reqid-1/2
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