ipsec, engine, imsd: the state file records the P-CSCF and a resume follows the kernel's SA peer
A resume compared PCSCF= against the kernel's SAs and, when they did not match, registered fresh without a word — a second initial REGISTER from an address whose registration is live; on KPN a fresh pair to the same P-CSCF meets the 21-minute refusal that costs the live registration (§13), what another P-CSCF does with it is unmeasured. The registration was made to whatever P-CSCF the SAs name (the SA setup takes imsd's previous pair out first), so that is where a resume belongs: SaPeer reads it from the dir-out transport policies — the one address a reqid-1 and a reqid-2 policy both name, each with imsd's fixed protected port as its selector's sport (reqid and mode alone are anyone's): the state text cannot tell the UE from the P-CSCF, a lone policy is not ours and a VPN's beside the pair changes nothing — TryResume resumes there, routes it, and says so when PCSCF= differs; the next fresh registration moves to PCSCF= and moves back when it fails before the SA setup and the old registration still stands (its address still on the link), as it already did between addresses, and its fallback Route is the P-CSCF it registers at, set before the 200's Service-Route is looked for — an empty Service-Route value counts as none — so a move never keeps the previous node's route. A file left by an attempt that got through the SA setup and did not live to record — to this or another P-CSCF — is recognised by its SA pair: the file's spi_uc/spi_us (a 0.3.x file carries them too) against the kernel's (FileNamesAnotherPair, Imsd:Ipsec, pinned in tests/Ipsec), instead of resumed with the wrong dialog; the state file gains pcscf, named in that line. Both fresh paths — the bring-up's and recovery's — now set their target themselves: with no PCSCF=, a bring-up that did not resume fails with its own message, and since no fresh one follows: a resumable pair whose attempt failed stays for the restart to resume, a pair nothing can resume — one the engine's rule wrote off during the attempt among them, a refresh refused with a 403 that carries a Retry-After or a binding a NOTIFY terminated under the re-REGISTER wait, decided once after both catch arms by its verdict (Reconnectable(), and with no fresh target Fresh(): a 401, a refusal with a Retry-After, the second refusal — with no fresh target every refusal reaches the reducer and its count travels in the holds, so the restart's refusal is the second, while with a target only a Retry-After does, as before — a refusal without one is not counted and the fresh registration follows at once; without the count a refused no-target resume would re-REGISTER on the same Call-ID at every RestartSec, the F16 loop) — is removed so the next bring-up finds nothing — and a recovery step that needs one restarts the daemon; the "PCSCF not set" check at the top of BringUp is gone, so a registration can be resumed with no setting at all. Three journal lines of the fresh-target path change with it: `resume connect failed; falling back to fresh` and `state file transport differs from SIP_TRANSPORT; fresh` end in `the next registration is a fresh one`, and a resume the engine writes off (a 403 with a Retry-After, a binding a NOTIFY terminated under the wait) logs `resume failed: … — written off by the network: the next registration is a fresh one` (§7.8). `no reg state file; resume falls back to fresh` keeps its text with a fresh target and ends in `nothing can resume it: the pair is removed` without one; the new `the state file names another SA pair (0x…/0x…[ to X]) than the kernel's (0x…/0x… to Y): another attempt's; …` line takes the same two tails. Tested: crafter-build test, 7 passed (tests/Engine: the refusal count's travel through the holds); the resume on the SA peer with the fresh target absent in builds of this series on the dev phone (KPN), and the no-target bring-up there with a resume that failed on a transport mismatch (the pair kept, the restart resumed) and with the state file removed (the pair removed, the next bring-up found nothing); the two dead-resume lines' no-target tail — a missing file, a file with another pair's SPIs — and the pair's removal on the tip's host build (bench 23f: a fake modem on PATH, a real xfrm in a namespace; a file with the pair's SPIs but another P-CSCF's address passes the check and the resume runs — `RESUME via existing SA`, the connect then failing in the namespace); on the dev phone (bench 41, the tip's build) a resume on a file without its pcscf key, the live pair's SPIs.
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21cb0f870d
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40a960f749
7 changed files with 448 additions and 84 deletions
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@ -1097,6 +1097,20 @@ int main() {
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n.Restore(5, m.Holds(5));
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Check(!n.Reconnectable() && freshAt(n, 5, 0), "…so the next start registers fresh at once instead of resuming");
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Check(!RegRecovery::Held{0, 0, 21, false}.Any(), "nothing gone, nothing held: nothing to keep");
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// the refusal count travels: a resume refused without a Retry-After at a start with no fresh target is one
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// refusal, the restart's is the second — without the travel every restart would be the first (F16's loop)
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RegRecovery rq;
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rq.OnReconnectFailure(10, F::Refused, 0, 503);
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auto hq = rq.Holds(20);
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Check(hq.Any() && hq.refusals == 1 && !hq.oldGone && hq.hold == 0, "a refusal without a Retry-After is held as a count, nothing else");
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RegRecovery sq;
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sq.Restore(100, hq);
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Check(!sq.Fresh() && sq.Reconnectable(), "the count alone gives nothing up");
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sq.OnReconnectFailure(100, F::Refused, 0, 503);
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Check(sq.Fresh() && sq.Reconnectable(), "the second refusal, across the restart, gives the resume up (fresh) without writing the registration off");
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RegRecovery tq;
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tq.OnReconnectFailure(10, F::Refused, 0, 401);
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Check(tq.Fresh() && tq.Reconnectable() && tq.Holds(20).refusals == 1, "a 401 gives the resume up at once; its count travels too");
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RegRecovery x;
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x.Restore(2000, RegRecovery::Held{86400, 86400, 21});
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Check(x.holdUntil == 2000 + 3600 && x.freshHoldUntil == 2000 + 3600, "a restored hold is cut to the hour like the Retry-After it came from");
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@ -101,6 +101,44 @@ int main() {
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Check(SaLocals(State, "2001:db8::999").empty(), "SaLocals: no SA to that P-CSCF -> none");
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}
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// ---- SaPeer: the P-CSCF the kernel's policies point at
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{
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auto peer = SaPeer(Policy);
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Check(peer && *peer == "2001:db8::105", "SaPeer: the dir-out policies' dst with reqid 1 and 2 agreeing");
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Check(!SaPeer("").has_value(), "SaPeer: no policies -> none");
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// a VPN's: tunnel mode, reqid 1, another destination — alone, and beside our pair
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constexpr std::string_view Vpn = "src 2001:db8::1/128 dst 2001:db8::2/128 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8::1 dst 2001:db8::2\n\t\tproto esp reqid 1 mode tunnel\n";
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constexpr std::string_view Vpn4 = "src 192.0.2.10/32 dst 0.0.0.0/0 \n\tdir out priority 383615 ptype main \n\ttmpl src 192.0.2.10 dst 192.0.2.1\n\t\tproto esp reqid 1 mode tunnel\n";
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Check(!SaPeer(Vpn).has_value(), "SaPeer: a lone reqid-1 policy (a VPN's) is not ours");
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auto beside = SaPeer(std::string(Policy) + std::string(Vpn));
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Check(beside && *beside == "2001:db8::105", "SaPeer: our pair beside a VPN's reqid-1 tunnel policy -> ours");
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auto beside4 = SaPeer(std::string(Vpn4) + std::string(Policy));
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Check(beside4 && *beside4 == "2001:db8::105", "SaPeer: our pair beside an IPv4 VPN's policy to 0.0.0.0/0 -> ours");
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// a transport policy to another address beside the pair: one address still carries both reqids
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const std::string other2 = "src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43/128 dst 2001:db8::106/128 sport 1 dport 2 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43 dst 2001:db8::106\n\t\tproto esp reqid 2 mode transport\n";
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const std::string other1 = "src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43/128 dst 2001:db8::106/128 sport 3 dport 4 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43 dst 2001:db8::106\n\t\tproto esp reqid 1 mode transport\n";
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auto one = SaPeer(std::string(Policy) + other2);
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Check(one && *one == "2001:db8::105", "SaPeer: a reqid-2 policy to another address beside the pair -> the pair's");
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Check(SaPeer(std::string(Policy) + other2 + other1) == "2001:db8::105", "SaPeer: another transport-mode reqid 1 + 2 pair beside ours, on other ports -> ours (the protected ports are the fingerprint)");
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Check(!SaPeer(other2 + other1).has_value(), "SaPeer: a transport-mode reqid 1 + 2 pair on other ports alone -> none (not imsd's)");
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const std::string ours2 = "src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43/128 dst 2001:db8::106/128 sport 45062 dport 2 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43 dst 2001:db8::106\n\t\tproto esp reqid 2 mode transport\n"
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"src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43/128 dst 2001:db8::106/128 sport 45061 dport 4 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43 dst 2001:db8::106\n\t\tproto esp reqid 1 mode transport\n";
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Check(!SaPeer(std::string(Policy) + ours2).has_value(), "SaPeer: two addresses each carrying imsd's fingerprint -> none (not one pair to tell apart)");
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// the fingerprint alone is not a pair: a reqid-1 policy without its reqid-2 partner, and two fingerprinted policies naming different addresses
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const std::string lone1 = "src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43/128 dst 2001:db8::107/128 sport 45061 dport 4 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43 dst 2001:db8::107\n\t\tproto esp reqid 1 mode transport\n";
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const std::string apart2 = "src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43/128 dst 2001:db8::108/128 sport 45062 dport 2 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43 dst 2001:db8::108\n\t\tproto esp reqid 2 mode transport\n";
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Check(!SaPeer(lone1).has_value(), "SaPeer: a lone fingerprinted reqid-1 policy (no reqid-2 partner) -> none");
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Check(!SaPeer(lone1 + apart2).has_value(), "SaPeer: a fingerprinted reqid-1 policy to one address and a fingerprinted reqid-2 policy to another -> none (not one pair)");
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Check(SaPeer(std::string(Policy) + apart2) == "2001:db8::105", "SaPeer: a fingerprinted reqid-2 policy to another address beside our pair -> the pair's");
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Check(!SaPeer(std::string(Vpn) + "src 2001:db8::1/128 dst 2001:db8::2/128 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8::1 dst 2001:db8::2\n\t\tproto esp reqid 2 mode tunnel\n").has_value(), "SaPeer: a tunnel-mode reqid 1 + 2 pair (a VPN's two child SAs) -> none");
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// transport mode is part of the fingerprint: a tunnel-mode reqid 1 + 2 pair carrying the protected ports is not ours
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const std::string tunnelOut1 = "src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43/128 dst 2001:db8::109/128 sport 45061 dport 4 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43 dst 2001:db8::109\n\t\tproto esp reqid 1 mode tunnel\n";
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const std::string tunnelOut2 = "src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43/128 dst 2001:db8::109/128 sport 45062 dport 2 \n\tdir out priority 0 \n\ttmpl src 2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43 dst 2001:db8::109\n\t\tproto esp reqid 2 mode tunnel\n";
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Check(!SaPeer(tunnelOut1 + tunnelOut2).has_value(), "SaPeer: a tunnel-mode reqid 1 + 2 pair carrying the protected ports -> none (transport mode is part of the fingerprint)");
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Check(SaPeer(std::string(Policy) + tunnelOut1 + tunnelOut2) == "2001:db8::105", "SaPeer: the same beside our pair -> ours");
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Check(SaPeer(State).has_value() == false, "SaPeer: state text (no dir out) -> none");
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}
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// ---- OwnXfrmDeleteCommands: imsd's own entries out of the kernel by exact key; everything else stays
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{
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const std::string ue = "2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:db43";
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@ -286,6 +324,15 @@ int main() {
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auto k = ChooseResumeSecurityVerify(kpn.securityServer, kpn, "aes-cbc");
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Check(k.source == Source::Stored && k.value == kpn.securityServer && k.mechanisms == 1, "resume: KPN's one-entry list for its pair -> the list, one mechanism");
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}
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// ---- a state file another attempt left behind: the file's UE SPIs against the kernel pair's
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{
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Check(!FileNamesAnotherPair(0x0526f2c0L, 0x0526f2c1L, 0x0526f2c0, 0x0526f2c1), "file pair: the pair's own SPIs -> the file is this pair's");
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Check(FileNamesAnotherPair(0x11111111L, 0x22222222L, 0x0526f2c0, 0x0526f2c1), "file pair: other SPIs -> another attempt's");
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Check(FileNamesAnotherPair(0x0526f2c0L, 0x22222222L, 0x0526f2c0, 0x0526f2c1), "file pair: one SPI differs -> another attempt's");
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Check(!FileNamesAnotherPair(std::nullopt, std::nullopt, 0x0526f2c0, 0x0526f2c1), "file pair: a file without the keys -> no verdict");
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Check(!FileNamesAnotherPair(0x11111111L, 0x22222222L, 0, 0x0526f2c1), "file pair: a missing inbound state (0) -> no verdict");
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Check(!FileNamesAnotherPair(0L, 0L, 0x0526f2c0, 0x0526f2c1), "file pair: zeros in the file -> no verdict");
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}
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// ---- selection rules and syntax corners
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{
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// spec-shaped list: every entry carries the SPI set, md5 preferred by q — we offered sha1, so sha1 wins (audit A1)
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