A resume compared PCSCF= against the kernel's SAs and, when they did not
match, registered fresh without a word — a second initial REGISTER from an
address whose registration is live; on KPN a fresh pair to the same P-CSCF
meets the 21-minute refusal that costs the live registration (§13), what
another P-CSCF does with it is unmeasured. The registration was made to
whatever P-CSCF the SAs name (the SA setup takes imsd's previous pair
out first), so that is where a resume belongs: SaPeer reads
it from the dir-out transport policies — the one address a reqid-1 and a
reqid-2 policy both name, each with imsd's fixed protected port as its
selector's sport (reqid and mode alone are anyone's): the state text cannot tell the UE from the
P-CSCF, a lone policy is not ours and a VPN's beside the pair changes
nothing — TryResume resumes there, routes it, and says so when PCSCF=
differs; the next fresh registration moves to PCSCF= and moves back when
it fails before the SA setup and the old registration still stands (its
address still on the link), as it already did between addresses, and
its fallback Route is the P-CSCF it registers at, set before the 200's
Service-Route is looked for — an empty Service-Route value counts as
none — so a move never keeps the previous node's route. A file left by an attempt that got through the SA setup and did not live
to record — to this or another P-CSCF — is recognised by its SA pair: the
file's spi_uc/spi_us (a 0.3.x file carries them too) against the kernel's
(FileNamesAnotherPair, Imsd:Ipsec, pinned in tests/Ipsec), instead of
resumed with the wrong dialog; the state file gains pcscf, named in that
line. Both fresh paths — the bring-up's and recovery's — now set
their target themselves: with no PCSCF=, a bring-up that did not resume
fails with its own message, and since no fresh one follows: a resumable
pair whose attempt failed stays for the restart to resume, a pair nothing
can resume — one the engine's rule wrote off during the attempt among them,
a refresh refused with a 403 that carries a Retry-After or a binding a NOTIFY
terminated under the re-REGISTER wait, decided once after both catch arms by
its verdict (Reconnectable(), and with no fresh target Fresh(): a 401, a
refusal with a Retry-After, the second refusal — with no fresh target
every refusal reaches the reducer and its count travels in the holds, so
the restart's refusal is the second, while with a target only a
Retry-After does, as before — a refusal without one is not counted and the
fresh registration follows at once; without the count a refused no-target resume would re-REGISTER on the
same Call-ID at every RestartSec, the F16 loop) — is removed so the next
bring-up finds nothing — and a recovery step that needs one restarts the daemon; the "PCSCF not set" check at the top of BringUp is gone, so a
registration can be resumed with no setting at all. Three journal lines of
the fresh-target path change with it: `resume connect failed; falling back
to fresh` and `state file transport differs from SIP_TRANSPORT; fresh` end
in `the next registration is a fresh one`, and a resume the engine writes
off (a 403 with a Retry-After, a binding a NOTIFY terminated under the wait)
logs `resume failed: … — written off by the network: the next registration
is a fresh one` (§7.8). `no reg state file; resume falls back to fresh`
keeps its text with a fresh target and ends in `nothing can resume it: the
pair is removed` without one; the new `the state file names another SA pair
(0x…/0x…[ to X]) than the kernel's (0x…/0x… to Y): another attempt's; …`
line takes the same two tails.
Tested: crafter-build test, 7 passed (tests/Engine: the refusal count's travel
through the holds); the resume on the SA peer with
the fresh target absent in builds of this series on the dev
phone (KPN), and the no-target bring-up there with a resume that failed on
a transport mismatch (the pair kept, the restart resumed) and with the
state file removed (the pair removed, the next bring-up found nothing); the
two dead-resume lines' no-target tail — a missing file, a file with another
pair's SPIs — and the pair's removal on the tip's host build (bench 23f: a
fake modem on PATH, a real xfrm in a namespace; a file with the pair's SPIs
but another P-CSCF's address passes the check and the resume runs — `RESUME
via existing SA`, the connect then failing in the namespace); on the dev
phone (bench 41, the tip's build) a resume on a file without its pcscf key,
the live pair's SPIs.
A fresh registration's SA setup began with `ip xfrm state flush` and `ip
xfrm policy flush`: every SA userspace had installed and every SPD policy
went, a policy-based VPN's (strongSwan's, libreswan's) SAs and policies
included. The setup now takes out what two rules select and leaves the
rest; and the SA reader, which took the P-CSCF ports for a resume from any
reqid-1/2 `dir out` policy — correct only while the flush left imsd's pair
alone in the kernel — takes them from the policies between our two
addresses only. Whether imsd runs beside a live strongSwan or libreswan
connection is unmeasured: the dev phone shows a tunnel policy and a tunnel
state left in place (Tested below), no more.
OwnXfrmDeleteCommands (Imsd:Ipsec) builds the deletes from the kernel text
the shell reads: every transport-mode policy with reqid 1 or 2 whose
selector carries imsd's protected port on the UE side, by the selector ip
xfrm policy prints (src, dst, proto, sport, dport, dev) and its direction,
and every transport-mode reqid-1/2 ESP state running from such a policy's
source to its destination or anchored on the UE's ims-PDN address, by src,
dst, proto esp and SPI — policy or not: a setup whose policy add failed
leaves such states (the setup logs a failed add and goes on), and an ESP
state another transport-mode user put on that address with reqid 1 or 2 goes
with them (an AH or IPComp state is not selected: the rule asks for ESP).
Every reader of the policy text — the deletes and the SA
reader's port pass here — goes through one predicate (detail::OwnPolicy),
written for whatever reads that text later.
BuildSetupCommands loses its two flush lines and the shell runs the deletes
right before it (RunOwnXfrmDeletes); BuildTeardownCommands, the same two
flushes with no caller, goes. A policy-based VPN's tunnel entries and
another transport-mode user's pair on other ports and addresses stay.
Residual: a transport-mode policy with reqid 1 and the UE-side port 45061,
or reqid 2 and 45062 — alone or paired, between any addresses — carries
imsd's fingerprint and goes, with the reqid-1/2 transport-mode ESP states
in its direction, and a reqid-1/2 transport-mode ESP state on the UE's
ims-PDN address goes whoever made it (tests/Ipsec pins both, and that an AH state
stays).
Tested: crafter-build test, 7 passed (the eight deletes byte-exact on the
fixture in the registered FP6's shape (synthetic addresses and keys); a VPN's tunnel SA and policies beside the pair
untouched; another transport-mode user's pair on other ports and addresses
untouched, its reqid-1 ESP state on the UE's address deleted whoever made
it, its AH state left; a policy-less state on the UE's address deleted, one
between other addresses left; the reader's ports from our pair beside
a foreign transport policy with ports); on the dev phone (KPN), in builds of
this series, a fresh registration with a VPN's tunnel policy and state in
the kernel: both still there afterwards, imsd's previous pair gone.
ParseExistingSa and SaLocals compared PCSCF= and LOCAL= as text against
`ip xfrm` output, which prints RFC 5952 form, so an upper-case or
uncompressed PCSCF= found no SAs and the restart registered fresh — on
KPN into the live-SA refusal; the holds file's pdn key compared the same
way. Both sides of each of those compares now go through
imsd::util::CanonicalAddr, LOCAL is canonicalised once on the way in, and PCSCF= is accepted in
that one spelling only — upper case, leading zeros or an uncompressed run
are refused at bring-up with the spelling to use, a dotted-quad tail (the
form ip prints for an IPv4-mapped address, which CanonicalIp6 does not read)
with the rule alone, a bracketed one by the bring-up script, which routes
the value as typed, with the rule (no brackets) — and a comma-separated
PCSCF= (a list) with its own message instead of reaching the socket layer: one spelling,
instead of a leniency both consumers of the setting would have to share.
Tested: crafter-build test, 7 passed; the upper-case PCSCF= refused with the spelling to use, a bracketed one
refused by the script, and the spelling they name resuming, in builds of
this series on the dev phone (KPN).
A warm resume rebuilt its Security-Verify from the kernel's SA: one
mechanism with hmac-sha-1-96 and aes-cbc written in, where RFC 3329
§2.3.1 has the client mirror the server's whole list. The fresh
registration kept the 401's list in memory, so a registration this
process made fresh echoed it; after a restart, the resumed
registration's re-REGISTER, its keepalives, its reg-event SUBSCRIBE and
its INVITEs carried the rebuilt entry until the next fresh registration.
KPN's one-entry answer to the default offer is the rebuilt entry byte
for byte; against a six-entry list (O2's) the mirror is broken, which
the RFC has the server answer with a 494, and a refused resume
registers fresh.
The fresh registration now stores the joined Security-Server value in the
state file (security_server, next to the challenge answer) and the resume
takes it from there, logging the mechanism count, when the entry
carrying its SPIs names the SA pair in the kernel: a file an attempt the
process did not live to record left behind (its SAs installed, its 200
not written) names another. A file from before this change holds none.
In both cases the resume falls back to the rebuilt entry, says which,
and the registration's next state write stores that entry, which is what
it echoes; the choice is Imsd:Ipsec's, pinned in tests/Ipsec with O2's
recorded list and KPN's. A value with a quote, a backslash or a newline in it is
written empty, which the resume treats as absent; RFC 3329's token
syntax produces none of these, a quoted-string extension parameter
could carry the first two.
Tested on the dev phone (KPN) with the build of this tree: a resume from
a state file the 0.3.11 daemon wrote logs the fallback and succeeds, so
do one from a file whose list names another SA pair and one whose list
is empty; two keepalives at a 120-s interval; a fresh registration
stores KPN's list byte-for-byte as the journal shows it received; a
restart resumes with the list from the file; an outgoing call.
The keepalive refresh and the resume's re-REGISTER carried an initial
registration's first-REGISTER Authorization — an empty nonce and
response — in the second REGISTER's frame, with a Security-Client
naming the SPIs and ports in use. TS 24.229 5.1.1.4.2 has a
reregistration carry the Authorization
of the last successful authentication — the last received nonce and
the last calculated response — and a Security-Client with the new
parameter values for the two SA pairs a re-authentication would set
up; TS 33.203 7.4.0 keeps the server ports and changes the client
ports. O2 UK refused the refresh of the old shape with 503 on every
occasion on record (alyx, 2026-09-24 to 10-08, a stationary phone
included) and accepted the fresh registrations that followed; KPN
accepted the old shape without a challenge.
The fresh registration now records the 401's nonce, our cnonce and
the response in the registration state (auth_nonce, auth_cnonce,
auth_response in the state file); a reregistration sends them
verbatim, mints new SPIs and proposes PortUcNext (45063) as the
client port with the server port unchanged. A registration resumed from a
state file written before this change has no answer: its
reregistrations carry the empty digest, as before, until its next
fresh registration, and the resume says so. A 401 to a reregistration asks
for re-authentication over temporary SAs on the proposed ports (TS
24.229 5.1.1.5.1), which imsd does not implement: the refresh throws
it as a refusal and RegRecovery makes the next step the fresh
registration, replacing the in-place answer over the old SAs.
Tested with the Messages and Engine suites and on the dev phone (KPN)
with a build of this commit's tree: a resume from the previous state
file, a fresh registration, a resume that sent the stored answer,
three refreshes at a 120-s interval, an outgoing call to a bench line
and an incoming call's ring.
imsd took the first global IPv6 on the ims netdev as its address, and
the kernel lists the temporary (privacy) SLAAC address first: `temporary
dynamic`, preferred for a day and valid for two by its lifetimes (read
2026-09-24). Contact, Via and the four SAs were bound to it, so once the
kernel removes it the registration has lost its address. The address
ModemManager assigned — the one the script installs — sat third on the
list. Seen on the dev phone; a field unit's journal shows the split too
— imsd registered on an address other than the one the script installed
(ims ledger F18).
Hand the assigned address to the daemon as LOCAL through /run/imsd.env,
next to DEV. For a manual run without it, prefer a global address that
is neither `temporary` nor `dynamic`, then any non-temporary one.
A restart after the upgrade finds the registration's SAs on the old
address. It resumes there while that address is still on the link, and
moves to the PDN's address in place: with its next fresh registration,
or when the old address leaves the link first. When the address it is
registered on leaves the netdev and the PDN's own address is not there
to move to, a registered imsd exits at its next recovery step, non-zero,
for a systemd restart, which runs the PDN bring-up again.
Tested on the dev phone (KPN) in builds of this series; not every path
has run there.
A P-CSCF may answer the challenge with every mechanism it supports and
attach the SPIs and ports to the one it applied. O2 UK's core lists six
ipsec-3gpp entries with q-values, md5 first, and marks the fourth (sha1,
no ealg). imsd took the first ealg= anywhere in the header - the 3DES of
an entry the P-CSCF had not selected - and installed SAs the far end
could not decrypt: every protected packet after the 401 was dropped at
its IPsec layer, over TCP and UDP alike, with nothing to answer.
The 401 handling now parses the Security-Server as a mechanism list
(commas outside quotes, parameters on semicolons, names and values
case-insensitive) and selects the highest-q ipsec-3gpp mechanism that
matches what Security-Client offered (RFC 3329 2.3.1, TS 24.229
5.1.1.5.1): alg equal to ours, ealg (absent = null) equal to the offer.
The SPIs and ports are per registration and come from the entry carrying
them. When no entry matches the offer, the entry carrying the SPIs is
installed as listed and the journal says so; hmac-md5-96 becomes
hmac(md5) with IK as the key. A single-mechanism header selects itself:
on KPN the SAs are the same as before (unit-pinned argv, verified on the
phone). An answer that cannot be used - no ipsec-3gpp entry, a missing
spi/port, an alg, ealg, prot or mod the kernel cannot be handed - defers
the bring-up on the throttle schedule with the reason, before the AKA is
spent, instead of a fatal that would restart imsd every RestartSec with
an initial REGISTER each time; spi-s=0 stays the throttle deferral.
Repeated Security-Server header lines are joined into the one list
Security-Verify echoes.
The journal shows the Security-Server line, the selected mechanism, the
SA parameters, and any ip xfrm command that fails (keys masked) at every
fresh registration - the silence this bug produced had no line to read.
Userspace VoLTE/IMS daemon for mainline Linux phones (developed on the
Fairphone 6): a GLib-free core (SIP, SDP, USIM AKA, IPsec SA setup, RTP
media, call engine) behind a GDBus control daemon, a standalone AMR-WB
media leg, and a Plasma Dialer backend. C++26 modules built with Crafter
Build; the tree is clean under the project's house-style linter
(crafter-build lint) across all three build products.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Signed-off-by: Jorijn van der Graaf <jorijnvdgraaf@catcrafts.net>
